Previous studies on social anxiety have demonstrated negative-expectancy bias in social contexts. In this study, we used a paradigm that employed self-relevant positive or negative social feedback, in order to test whether this negative expectancy manifests in event-related potentials (ERPs) during social evaluation among socially anxious individuals. Behavioral data revealed that individuals with social anxiety disorder (SAD) showed more negative expectancy of peer acceptance both in the experiment and in daily life than did the healthy control (HC) participants. Regarding ERP results, we found a overally larger P2 for positive social feedback and also a group main effect, such that the P2 was smaller in SAD group. SAD participants demonstrated a larger FRN to positive feedback than to negative feedback. In addition, SAD participants showed a more positive △FRN (△FRN = negative - positive). Furthermore, acceptance expectancy in daily life correlated negatively with △FRN amplitude, while the Interaction Anxiousness Scale (IAS) score correlated positively with the △FRN amplitude. Finally, the acceptance expectancy in daily life fully mediated the relationship between the IAS and △FRN. These results indicated that both groups could differentiate between positive and negative social feedback in the early stage of social feedback processing (reflected on the P2). However, the SAD group exhibited a larger FRN to positive social feedback than to negative social feedback, demonstrating their dysfunction in the late stage of social feedback processing. In our opinion, such dysfunction is due to their greater negative social feedback expectancy.

The social environment presents the human brain with the most complex information processing demands. The computations that the brain must perform occur in parallel, combine social and nonsocial cues, produce verbal and nonverbal signals and involve multiple cognitive systems, including memory, attention, emotion and learning. This occurs dynamically and at timescales ranging from milliseconds to years. Here, we propose that during social interactions, seven core operations interact to underwrite coherent social functioning; these operations accumulate evidence efficiently—from multiple modalities—when inferring what to do next. We deconstruct the social brain and outline the key components entailed for successful human–social interaction. These include (i) social perception; (ii) social inferences, such as mentalizing; (iii) social learning; (iv) social signaling through verbal and nonverbal cues; (v) social drives (e.g. how to increase one’s status); (vi) determining the social identity of agents, including oneself and (vii) minimizing uncertainty within the current social context by integrating sensory signals and inferences. We argue that while it is important to examine these distinct aspects of social inference, to understand the true nature of the human social brain, we must also explain how the brain integrates information from the social world.

Studies have shown that during social interaction a shared system underlies inferring one’s own mental state, and the mental states of others – processes often referred to as mentalization. However, no validated assessment has been developed to measure second order mentalization (one’s beliefs about how transparent one’s thoughts are to others), or whether this capacity plays a significant role in social interaction. The current work presents a interactive mentalization theory, which divides these directional and second order aspects of mentalization, and investigates whether these constructs are measurable, stable, and meaningful in social interactions. We developed a 20-item, self-report interactive mentalization questionnaire (IMQ) in order to assess the different sub-components of mentalization: self–self, self–other, and other–self mentalization (Study 1). We then tested this scale on a large, online sample, and report convergent and discriminant validity in the form of correlations with other measures (Study 2), as well as correlations with social deception behaviors in real online interaction with Mturk studies (Study 3 and Study 4). These results validate the IMQ, and support the idea that these three factors can predict mentalization in social interaction.

Negative emotions play a dominant role in daily human life, and mentalizing and empathy are also basic sociability in social life. However, little is known regards the neurophysiological pattern of negative experiences in immersive environments and how people with different sociabilities respond to the negative emotional stimuli at behavioral and neural levels. The present study investigated the neurophysiological representation of negative affective experiences and whether such variations are associated with one's sociability. To address this question, we examined four types of negative emotions that frequently occurred in real life: angry, anxious, fearful, and helpless. We combined naturalistic neuroimaging under virtual reality, multimodal neurophysiological recording, and behavioral measures. Inter-subject representational similarity analysis was conducted to capture the individual differences in the neurophysiological representations of negative emotional experiences. The behavioral and neurophysiological indices revealed that although the emotion ratings were uniquely different, a similar electroencephalography response pattern across these negative emotions was found over the parieto-occipital electrodes. Furthermore, the neurophysiological representations indeed reflected interpersonal variations regarding mentalizing and empathic abilities. Our findings yielded a common pattern of neurophysiological responses toward different negative affective experiences in VR. Moreover, the current results indicate the potential of taking a sociability perspective for understanding the interpersonal variations in the neurophysiological representation of emotion.

The defining pathological features of social anxiety disorder primarily concern the social landscape, yet few empirical studies have examined the potentially aberrant behavioral and neural patterns in this population using socially interactive paradigms. We addressed this issue by investigating the behavioral and neural patterns associated with social conformity in patients with social anxiety disorder. We recorded event-related potentials when healthy subjects (n = 19), and patients with social anxiety disorder (n = 20) made attractiveness judgements of unfamiliar others, while at the same time, being exposed to congruent/incongruent peer ratings. Afterwards, participants were asked to rerate the same faces without the presence of peer ratings. When compared with healthy controls, social anxiety disorder patients exhibited more positive attitudes to unfamiliar others and conformed more with peers-higher feedback. These behavioral effects were in parallel with neural responses associated with social conflict in the N400 signal, showing higher conformity to peers-higher feedback compared with peers-lower or peers-agree feedback among social anxiety disorder patients. Our findings provide evidence on the behavioral and neural patterns of social anxiety disorder during social interactions, and support the hypothesis that individuals with social anxiety disorder are more motivated to pursue social acceptance and possibly avoid social rejection.