This paper investigates the cost-sharing strategies of a manufacturer, a retailer and a third-party recycler in a Stackelberg game considering government subsidy and retailer’s service effort. Next, we construct profit functions of the manufacturer, the retailer and the third-party recycler considering government subsidy and service effort for four scenarios: no cost-sharing (N), service investment cost-sharing (I), recycling investment cost-sharing (II), and both service and recycling investment cost-sharing (III). Furthermore, we obtain the optimal results and discuss the impact of cost-sharing ratio, service cost coefficient, government subsidy and service sensitivity coefficient on profits and social net benefits. The results show that the service investment cost-sharing strategy cannot achieve profit coordination, and under certain conditions, the recycling investment cost-sharing strategy and the service and recycling investment cost-sharing strategy can achieve profit coordination. In addition, changes in different factors such as government subsidy, service cost coefficients, and service sensitivity coefficients will affect the effectiveness of cost-sharing strategies.

With the development and promotion of remanufacturing, remanufactured products have gradually become popular. And the production of remanufactured products cannot be separated from the support of remanufacturing technology. However, it is not clear whether the implementation of remanufacturing technological innovation can benefit enterprises. Moreover, the evidence from industry practice shows that the power structure has a substantial influence on the decision-making behavior of enterprises. Therefore, we combined remanufacturing technological innovation and three power structures and constructed six models to analyze the effects of remanufacturing technological innovation and power structures on supply chain decisions in the competitive environment of new and remanufactured products. The results show that under a certain power structure, remanufacturing technological innovation can make supply chain members obtain higher profits. In the case of remanufacturing technological innovation, there is less investment in remanufacturing technological innovation under the manufacturer-led structure. At this time, when consumers are not sufficiently sensitive to remanufacturing technological innovation, the manufacturer will try to dominate as much as possible in pursuit of their interests. However, the supply chain system profit and social welfare under the manufacturer-led structure are not dominant. The Vertical Nash structure is more beneficial to the system profit and social welfare under this condition. When consumers are sufficiently sensitive to remanufacturing technological innovation, member profits, system profit, and social welfare can benefit from the retailer-led structure. In addition, changes in consumers’ sensitivity to remanufacturing technological innovation will not affect the retailer’s pursuit of more profits. The retailer-led is always the best choice for the retailer. This research result fills in the blank of the impact of remanufacturing technological innovation on supply chain decision-making in the competitive environment of new products and remanufactured products and can provide decision-making references for manufacturers, remanufacturers, retailers, and the government.

Research shows that technology is an important challenge for companies to advance the remanufacturing business. How to make pricing decisions with remanufacturing technological innovation in a competitive environment is the key to improving the efficiency of corporate remanufacturing and reuse of used resources. Therefore, this paper studies the pricing decision-making issues of the manufacturer and the remanufacturer with/without remanufacturing technological innovation in a competitive environment. Our results show that, in the internal competitive environment of the manufacturer, remanufacturing technological innovation does not affect the pricing of new products, but it will affect the demand and thus the profit of the manufacturer. In the environment of the coexistence of internal and external competition of the manufacturer, the manufacturer (remanufacturer)'s implementing remanufacturing technological innovation is the dominant strategy for pricing and profits. In addition, consumers' evaluation of discounts of remanufactured products from the remanufacturer inhibits the manufacturer's profit growth. At the same time, this evaluation does not always bring profit to the remanufacturer. Only if the discount evaluation is at a moderate level, the remanufacturer can be profitable and obtain the optimal profit. This research provides a reference on when to implement remanufacturing technological innovation and on how to invest in remanufacturing technological innovation for manufacturers and remanufacturers.