Based on the discrete event-triggered communication scheme (DETCS), a codesign method of dual security control and communication for the non-linear cyberphysical system (CPS) with denial-of-service (DoS) attack and actuator fault is studied under multi-objective constraints. First, to effectively distinguish DoS attacks with different energy levels, the DoS attack detection method is established based on the maximum allowable delay of the system. Second, a non-linear CPS dual security control framework that integrates active-passive attack tolerance for DoS attack and active fault tolerance for actuator fault is constructed. Third, the low-energy DoS attack is regarded as a special kind of time delay, and a robust observer for the estimation of system states and actuator fault is designed, and a codesign method of passive attack tolerance, active fault tolerance, and communication is proposed. Furthermore, a correction compensation algorithm of control quantity is proposed for high-energy DoS attack based on the PID idea to make active-passive attack tolerance more effective. Finally, the effectiveness of the proposed method is verified by the simulation of a quadruple-tank model.

In this study, a co-design method of dual security control and communication is investigated for a nonlinear cyber–physical system (CPS) with an actuator fault and false data injection (FDI) attacks. First, under the discrete event trigger communication scheme, considering the different effects of actuator fault and FDI attacks on a double-end network, a dual security control strategy with active fault-tolerance and active–passive attack-tolerance is proposed. It can accommodate an actuator fault, actively compensate an actuator FDI attack, and passively resist a sensor FDI attack, respectively, thereby establishing a new dual security control framework with fault-tolerance and attack-tolerance. Moreover, the Takagi–Sugeno (T-S) fuzzy model for the nonlinear CPS is established under this framework. Second, by constructing an appropriate Lyapunov–Krasovskii functional and introducing the time-delay theory and the affine Bessel–Legendre inequality, lesser conservative design methods of a robust augmented observer for the estimation of the state, FDI attacks, and fault as well as a dual security controller are obtained. Finally, a classical quadruple-tank model is used to show the validity and feasibility of the proposed method.

This study addresses an integrated security control and communication co-design problem for nonlinear CPSs subject to coexisting FDI attacks and actuator faults. A novel adaptive discrete event-triggered communication scheme (ADETCS) is proposed. Its triggering threshold adapts to the system state. State estimation, fault estimation, and attack detection are all migrated to the control unit. Based on this framework, a closed-loop T–S fuzzy model is established for active defense against actuator faults and dual-end FDI attacks. A robust augmented observer is then developed via Lyapunov stability theory to jointly estimate system states, actuator faults, and FDI attacks. Sufficient conditions are further derived for an integrated security controller that unifies attack tolerance and fault tolerance. Simulation results on a quadruple-tank system show that the proposed method effectively counteracts coexisting attacks and faults while significantly reducing resource consumption. Over an 800-s horizon, data transmissions drop to 712 (8.9% transmission rate). The sensor-node computational load is also reduced from 8000 time-triggered executions to 712 event-triggered ones.

This research studies the co-designing security control and adaptive event-triggered communication for a nonlinear CPS that experiences DoS attacks and actuator faults. First, a new communication scheme that adjusts adaptively to events is developed, and the threshold for triggering this scheme dynamically varies based on the state of the system, resulting in a more efficient utilization of network communication resources. Additionally, utilizing ADETCS as a foundation, a structure for safeguarding nonlinear CPS is constructed. Thirdly, the assistance of Lyapunov theory, time delay system theory and less conservativeness techniques are utilized, a observer is designed to observe the estimation of state and fault in real time, along with a security controller to ensure tolerance against attacks and faults. Finally, the simulation case of the classical quadruple-tank model is adopt to verify the viability and efficiency of the proposed approach.