Yang Zhi

Mr. Yang Zhi


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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31 May 2025 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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YZYang Zhi
Yang Zhi
XZXiaoyu Zha
Xiaoyu Zha
Faced with mounting pressure to achieve high-quality green transformation, manufacturing enterprises are increasingly scrutinized for greenwashing behaviors. This study develops a novel hybrid modeling framework that combines evolutionary game theory with the SEIR epidemic model to investigate the dynamic interactions between environmental regulation, media pressure, and green innovation behavior. The model captures how strategic decisions among boundedly rational actors evolve over time under dual external pressures. Simulation results show that stronger environmental regulatory intensity accelerates the adoption of substantive green innovation and concurrently reduces the media pressure associated with greenwashing. Moreover, while social media disclosure has a limited impact during the early stages of greenwashing information diffusion, its influence becomes significantly amplified once a critical dissemination threshold is surpassed, rapidly transforming latent information into widespread public concern. This amplification triggers significant public opinion pressure, which, in turn, incentivizes local governments to enforce stricter environmental policies. The findings reveal a synergistic governance mechanism where environmental regulation and media scrutiny jointly curb greenwashing and foster genuine corporate sustainability.

29 April 2024 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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KQKai Qi
Kai Qi
XGXinyuan Guo
Xinyuan Guo
XGXinying Guan
Xinying Guan
YZYang Zhi
Yang Zhi
The continuous deterioration of the ecological environment and the increasing scarcity of resources have posed a serious challenge to the survival and development of human beings, and the implementation of green supply chain management (GSCM) in this context is an effective means to ensure the sustainable development of society and the economy. In order to seek the optimal strategy of evolutionary game in the implementation of green supply chain management and explore the influence of environmental regulation intensity and public preference degree on the evolution process of green supply chain management diffusion development, this paper takes the study of green supply chain management diffusion as the core innovation point, and under the premise of environmental regulation, selects the government, the core enterprise, and the public as the participating bodies of green supply chain management diffusion, and uses the theory of evolutionary game to construct a diffusion model of green supply chain management. Using evolutionary game theory to construct a diffusion model, and with the help of MATLAB and other mathematical tools for numerical simulation analysis, we discuss the diffusion of the green supply chain and derive the optimal combination strategy. The results of the study show that: (1) there are four evolutionary stable states in the process of green supply chain management diffusion: preliminary diffusion, extinction, semi-diffusion, and full diffusion; (2) it will be beneficial for the government to promote the evolutionary diffusion of green supply chain management by implementing a higher intensity of pollution tax policy while implementing green supply chain incentive strategies; (3) the government, while implementing environmental regulation policies, should also pay attention to the guidance of the public’s awareness of environmental friendliness and greenness, and focus on the role of the comprehensive strategy selection of the three parties of the game in reaching the optimal state. The conclusions of the study provide theoretical guidance and decision support for the implementation and diffusion of green supply chain management under environmental regulation.

25 May 2025 in Buildings
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
XZXiaoyu Zha
Xiaoyu Zha
YZYang Zhi
Yang Zhi
BHBo Hou
Bo Hou
FZFeng Zhang
Feng Zhang
The adoption of green building materials (GBMs) has become increasingly important in reducing carbon emissions and realizing zero-carbon cities. Although some scholars have investigated the decision-making of GBMs adoption in markets, they mainly focused on the impact factors of GBMs adoption without considering consumers’ multi-channel purchasing behavior. Thus motivated, this paper aims to develop a theoretical game model incorporating consumers’ multi-channel purchasing behavior and study the optimal sales strategies of GBMs manufacturers and retailers in markets for promoting GBMs adoption. To do this, not only the equilibrium outcome on sales strategy is examined, but also the effects of different GBMs sales strategies on urban environments and social welfare are theoretically verified. It is found that (1) the equilibrium sales strategy relies on two core parameters, namely matching rate and online return cost. Only when the matching rate is low and the online return cost is at a medium level can the GBMs manufacturer and retailer achieve a strategic consensus, and the equilibrium sales strategy is S (i.e., selling GBMs through the online channel, offline channel, and store-to-online channel). (2) When pursuing total profits of manufacturers and retailers in GBMs markets, the S sales strategy is 100% superior to the D sales strategy (i.e., selling GBMs only through online and offline channels). This is because the introduction of a store-to-online channel can reduce online return losses by providing consumers with physical experiences. (3) When pursuing social welfare (refers to public benefits including consumer surplus, urban environmental impacts, and others), the D sales strategy is optimal if the matching rate is relatively large and the return cost is low. (4) Under certain conditions, governments should incentivize GBMs manufacturers and retailers to adopt the D sales strategy through regulatory instruments, so as to achieve a balance between economic benefits and social benefits.