Learning-by-doing is a prevailing phenomenon in which a firm's production cost decreases in its production quantity. We build a two-period model to investigate the coopetition effect of learning-by-doing in a supply chain with two competing original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) outsourcing to a common contract manufacturer (CM) whose production exhibits the learning-by-doing effect. Excluding the learning cooperation between OEMs, the learning-by-doing intensifies the price competition to such an extent that OEMs' two-period overall profits could be lower than the case of no learning. Outsourcing to a common CM brings OEMs higher learning benefits which dominate the negative effect of intensified competition. OEMs' two-period overall profits are always higher in this case. Interestingly, increasing the product substitution rate has two opposite effects on the OEMs' overall profits. Under certain condition, OEMs' profits might be increasing in the substitution rate since the positive cooperation effect dominates the negative competition effect. With coopetition effect of learning-by-doing, we show that OEMs' other simpler pricing strategies, such as myopic pricing and uniform pricing, may outperform the strategic differential pricing strategy. Moreover, when the two OEMs are significantly differentiated in market base, the larger OEM may prefer not outsourcing to a common CM due to the coopetition concern. Finally, we find that asymmetric production learning and CM's pricing power have important impacts on OEMs' decisions and profits.
Competing firms may engage in group buying (GB) to benefit from a quantity discount from a common supplier. We study GB under different power structures (i.e., Nash and Stackelberg) and investigate how the power structures can be endogenized along with the resulting GB outcome. We employ a game-theoretic framework in which two firms under Cournot competition can group their purchases if it is beneficial compared to individual purchasing. We show that under exogenous power structures, when the two firms have highly asymmetric market bases, Nash GB is unattainable due to severe co-opetition conflict, and Stackelberg GB can better resolve the conflict. Our results suggest that power structures may fundamentally affect firms’ GB incentives, and no power structure is always superior to others. We then endogenize the power structures of the two firms based on a two-stage extended game. Using Pareto-risk dominance, we identify conditions under which one firm endogenously emerges as the Stackelberg leader with the rival as the follower, as well as the conditions under which both firms endogenously choose Nash GB or opt for independent purchasing. We demonstrate that the two firms can largely resolve the battle for GB leadership and achieve an efficient outcome in most cases. Our study is the first to compare different exogenous power structures and consider endogenous power structures in the context of GB.