Due to the depletion of the public IPv4 address pool, the transition to IPv6 became inevitable. However, this ongoing transition is taking a long time, and the two incompatible versions of the Internet Protocol must coexist. Different IPv6 transition technologies were developed, which can be used to enable communication in various scenarios, but they also involve additional security issues. In this paper, first, we introduce our methodology for analyzing the security of IPv6 transition technologies in a nutshell. Then, we develop a priority classification method for the ranking of different IPv6 transition technologies and their most important implementations, so that the vulnerabilities of the most crucial ones may be examined first. Next, we conduct a comprehensive survey of the existing IPv6 transition technologies by describing their application scenarios and the basics of their operation and we also determine the priorities of their security analysis according to our ranking system. Finally, we show that those IPv6 transition technologies that we gave high priorities, cover the most relevant scenarios.

Benchmarking methodologies that address the performance of network interconnect devices that are IPv4-or IPv6-capable exist, but the IPv6 transition technologies are outside of their scope. This document provides complementary guidelines for evaluating the performance of IPv6 transition technologies. More specifically, this document targets IPv6 transition technologies that employ encapsulation or translation mechanisms, as dual-stack nodes can be tested using the recommendations of RFCs 2544 and 5180. The methodology also includes a metric for benchmarking load scalability.

In this paper, we examine the performance of four authoritative DNS server implementations (BIND, NSD, Knot DNS, and YADIFA). In our tests, we apply the measurement procedure defined in Section 9 of RFC 8219. Our aim is threefold: to provide DNS operators with ready to use measurement results to support their selection of the best fitting authoritative DNS server implementation for their needs, to assist researchers and DNS64 server developers in finding a suitable authoritative DNS server implementation for their DNS64 benchmarking measurements, and to advance the theory and practice of benchmarking DNS servers. We examine how the different conditions such as the number of active CPU cores, the size of the zone file, the applied timeout, and the type of the processor influence the performance of the tested authoritative DNS server implementations. The performance of all four tested DNS servers scales up more or less well with the number of CPU cores, except for YADIFA. The increase of the size of the zone file causes significant degradation only in the performance of BIND, which shows different anomalies described in the paper. The change of the timeout from 250ms (required by RFC 8219) to 100ms usually causes only a small performance degradation. We point out that NSD and Knot DNS can achieve an order of magnitude higher performance than BIND and YADIFA.