Low-carbon production is currently the development direction of enterprises. The government provides low-carbon subsidies to low-carbon manufacturing enterprises to promote the formation of a green supply chain. To better encourage the development of the green supply chain by determining government subsidies and platform authentication fees, this paper constructs a Stackelberg game model that consists of a supplier and a manufacturer, and solves the optimal decisions of each entity using the backward induction method. This study uses the matching method to analyze the payoff matrix for supply chain members when choosing between low-carbon and traditional production. After introducing the online trading platform, the impact of the platform on the profit of supply chain members is studied, considering whether the authentication service provided by the platform is completely accurate. The results show that (1) in the green supply chain, there is a relationship between the enterprises’ profit and the level of emissions reduction, which increases first and then decreases. (2) The online trading platform is conducive to achieving green supply chain coordination. The government can pay fewer subsidies to prompt the formation of a green supply chain and the optimal emissions reduction level of the enterprise is higher. (3) When the authentication mechanism of the platform is imperfect, the authentication fee of the platform and the subsidy coefficient of the government need to be set within a reasonable range to avoid the enterprise adopting traditional production pretending to be the low-carbon type. This study contributes to research on the green supply chain and provides insights into pricing strategies for governments and platforms.

The low-carbon cooperation between providers and demanders is one of the ways to achieve sustainable development in cloud manufacturing, which has become an important issue. However, the effective ways for the cloud platform to encourage such cooperation are unclear. Considering the low-carbon strategies of the supply and demand sides and the regulation of the cloud platform, an evolutionary game model involving service providers, service demanders, and the cloud platform is established, and the tripartite evolutionary stability is discussed. Further, the impacts of important factors, such as regulatory costs, on the tripartite strategies are analyzed through numerical simulation. The results illustrate that the cloud platform reasonably optimizes the rewards and penalties for low-carbon cooperation to promote the enthusiastic participation of service providers and demanders. The cloud platform can set penalties (rewards) for providers based on their low-carbon costs and rewards (penalties). Additionally, the low-carbon costs of service providers and the additional costs of demanders negatively affect the low-carbon cooperation between providers and demanders. Meanwhile, the low-carbon costs and additional costs for the providers and demanders to engage in low-carbon cooperation are affected by the rewards and penalties of the cloud platform. The results could provide insights into the game decisions of the supply and demand sides and the cloud platform, facilitating sustainable supply chain advancement.

This paper primarily investigates the resource allocation problem in cloud manufacturing. Unlike other research institutes, the resources considered in this research are entity manufacturing resources, which possess a regional nature. In order to approach real-world scenarios, this study takes into account the budget constraints of buyers and examines the manufacturing combinations of buyers under these constraints. The paper models the allocation process of physical resources in cloud manufacturing through a bilateral combinatorial auction and establishes a combinatorial double auction mechanism that takes into consideration both budget constraints and logistics costs. Experimental results confirm that the matching success rate of the proposed scheme remains stable at over 60%, demonstrating its feasibility. Moreover, with the increase of cloud platform users, the stability and transaction rate of the mechanism also exhibit a corresponding increase.

Aiming at the low-carbon cooperation between service providers and demanders in the cloud manufacturing mode, a tripartite stochastic evolutionary game model of low-carbon cooperation among service providers, demanders and the cloud platform is established. According to the stability criterion theorem of stochastic differential equations, the conditions for strategy evolutionary stability are analyzed. Finally, the impacts of important factors on the strategy evolution are analyzed, such as reward and punishment of cloud platform. Simulation shows that: low-carbon costs and random factors have a negative impact on low-carbon cooperation between providers and demanders, and the appropriate rewards and punishments have a positive impact on low-carbon cooperation between providers and demanders.