OBJECTIVES: This study presents the response of a military unit to an outbreak of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) in Gyeonggi Province. As soon as 2 soldiers were identified as index cases, the infectious disease investigators of the Gyeonggi Provincial Government, Korea Disease Control and Prevention Agency, and the Armed Forces Epidemiologic Investigation Center discussed the investigation and response plan for an imminent massive outbreak.METHODS: The joint immediate response team (IRT) conducted interviews with confirmed COVID-19 patients, reviewed their medical records, performed contact tracing using global positioning system data, and undertook a field investigation. For risk assessment, the joint IRT visited all 8 sites of the military units and the army chaplain’s church to evaluate the transmission risk at each site. The evaluation items included the size of the site, the use of air conditioning, whether windows were opened, and whether masks were worn. Pooled testing was used for the low-risk population to quickly detect the spread of COVID-19 in the military base.RESULTS: One day before the symptom onset of the index case, the lecturer and >50% of the attendees were infected with COVID-19 while attending a lecture that lasted 2 hours and 30 minutes. Attendees were not wearing masks and were in a poorly ventilated room.CONCLUSIONS: Since COVID-19 can be spread before symptom onset, contact tracing must be performed to investigate potential exposures prior to symptom onset and to manage any exposed persons.
This study investigated the causes and risks for infection spread in three psychiatric hospitals in Chung-buk, South Korea, to strategize measures to block transmission and prevent a large-scale epidemic. From December 2020 to January 2021, 358 inpatients of Psychiatric Hospitals A, B, and C were enrolled to identify the epidemiological characteristics of confirmed patients. Epidemic curves and propagation relationships were constructed and a genotype analysis was conducted. The index case inpatient from Hospital A transmitted the infection to patients in Hospitals B and C; the infection was confirmed in 47, 193, and 118 patients in Hospitals A, B, and C, respectively. The patient characteristics hampered communication and the close identification of symptom onset. The incidence rate was 10 (2.9%) among employees and 348 (35.8%) among inpatients. The relative risk was 12.1 (95% CI: 6.6–22.5) times higher among inpatients than employees. Next-generation sequencing confirmed the probable infection source as a genotype identical to that of two different outbreaks, although the infection spread was undetermined. Direct risk factors emerged from patient characteristics, wherein cohort isolation was meaningless due to uncontrolled communication. Indirect risk factors included hospital-specific problems due to external factors (non-patient system deficiencies or employee negligence). Prior inspections, a confirmation of non-infection, and institutional emergent measures are needed.