Runoff of agricultural nutrients and sediments has led to re-eutrophication of lakes and impaired stream health in the Great Lakes Basin since around 2000 following earlier success in protecting water quality. Substantial investment in conservation actions has had insufficient impact, due in part to a limited basis for understanding the likely environmental outcomes of those investments. This article introduces a special section focusing on promoting investment that produces environmental outcomes as opposed to investing in conservation actions with unknown effects. The special section contains articles in three main categories: 1) studies based on fine-grain SWAT and other simulation modeling that can guide the type, amount, and location of conservation investments to increase their environmental impact; 2) edge-of-field measurement studies that provide updated knowledge to assist in further refining models to increase their predictive power; and 3) articles presenting innovative approaches to incentivizing outcome-oriented conservation investment. Implementation approaches discussed include certifying private crop nutrient advisors as recommending only appropriate timing, amount, and placement of nutrients; working within the existing public drain management system to incentivize conservation; and others. The special section shows that advances in SWAT modeling provide a powerful basis for targeting conservation investments to protect water quality in the Great Lakes Basin, while also demonstrating opportunities to further refine the models. It illustrates both the opportunity and the need to engage in more innovative institutional design of agricultural management programs that go beyond the traditional government programs and do more to reward outcomes and not just actions

This article reviews 15 payment for watershed services (PWS) programs in Asia, most of which are in early stages of implementation. Important constraints against PWS in Asia include high population density that escalates transaction costs of contracting potential service suppliers, and state control over most forestlands. China has two nationwide programs that encourage afforestation to arrest soil erosion. Indonesia has several local PWS schemes to conserve catchments upstream of dams and hydroelectric plants. Vietnam, Nepal, and the Philippines have similar initiatives, funded by international donors or local hydroelectric companies. India presents two cases where village communities came up with innovative social arrangements to secure watershed services. However, in most cases conditionality is weakly enforced, and participation may be mandatory. Government is the major buyer of watershed services, while private or quasi-private companies are involved in a few watersheds in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Nepal. Evidence of PWS on poverty alleviation is tenuous in most cases. China's Sloping Land Conversion Program has helped the poor increase their asset base while landless farmers in Indonesia have received conditional land tenure.

Interdisciplinary analytical perspectives can bring important insights to address complex sustainability problems. In this paper we present and apply a model that integrates perspectives from economics and communication sciences to address the question of what happens to pro-environmental behavior after the introduction and then the withdrawal of payment for environmental services (PES). In particular, we discuss the effects of financial incentives on social norms and the effects of norms on subsequent behavior after incentives have ended. This is important because the dominant literature on PES lacks a sophisticated understanding of social norms and fails to address what will happen to behavior once payments end. That literature addresses the potential problem that payments can crowd out or possibly crowd in intrinsic sources of motivation for pro-social behavior, but it lacks the sophisticated understanding of social norms that has the potential to help explain and address this phenomenon. We summarize experimental evidence based on our model showing that introducing a financial incentive for behavior change can change social norms around that behavior. These norms, in turn, can continue to influence behavior even after incentives have ended. PES programs can address this situation by actively evoking existing social norms in favor of conservation.