Does the mere crowdedness of the environment affect people's choices and preferences? In six studies, the authors show that social crowdedness not only leads to greater accessibility of safety-related constructs but also results in greater preference for safety-oriented options (e.g., preferring to visit a pharmacy to a convenience store), being more receptive to prevention- (rather than promotion-) framed messages, and being more risk averse with real money gambles. In support of the authors’ underlying avoidance motivation perspective, these effects are mediated by participants’ net prevention focus and are attenuated when the crowd in question consists of in-group members. The authors close by discussing the practical and theoretical implications of the results.

This article is about social space and material objects for sale within that space. We draw primarily on Goffman’s (1971) concepts of use space and possession territories to predict that as the social density of a given space increases, inferences of the subjective social class and income of people in that space fall. Eight studies confirm that this is indeed the case, with the result holding even for stick figures, thus controlling for typical visual indicators of social class such as clothing or jewelry. Furthermore, these social class inferences mediate a relationship between social density and product valuation, with individuals assessing both higher prices and a greater willingness to pay for products presented in less crowded contexts. This effect of inferred class on product valuation is explained by status-motivated individuals’ desire to associate with higher-status people. To the best of our knowledge, this research is the first to reveal the link between social density, status inferences, and object valuations. As such, it makes a novel contribution to what has come to be known in sociology as the topological turn: a renewed focus on social space.

This research demonstrates that individuals make moral judgments based on ideological inferences from facial cues. Using racially homogeneous male faces, four studies showed that individuals infer ideological beliefs—and thus group membership (in- versus out-group)—from a novel face and that the fit between the inferred social identity and the perceiver’s own social identity leads to judgments of moral superiority. Further evidence shows that a salient social identity moderates moral evaluation. These results reflect the automaticity of social categorization, which contributes to moral judgments of a person.