The Internet of Things (IoT) has transformed various domains in our lives by enabling seamless communication and data exchange between interconnected devices, necessitating robust networking infrastructure. This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of code injection attacks in IoT, focusing on the wireless domain. Code injection attacks exploit security weaknesses in applications or software and can have severe consequences, such as data breaches, financial losses, and denial of service. This paper discusses vulnerabilities in IoT systems and examines how wireless frames in state-of-the-art wireless technologies, which serve IoT applications, are exposed to such attacks. To demonstrate the severity of these threats, we introduce a comprehensive framework illustrating code injection attacks in the wireless domain. Several code injection attacks are performed on Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi) devices operating on an embedded system commonly used in IoT applications. Our proof of concept reveals that the victims’ devices become further exposed to a full range of cyber-attacks following a successful severe code injection attack. We also demonstrate three scenarios where malicious codes had been detected inside the firmware of wireless devices used in IoT applications by performing reverse engineering techniques. Criticality analysis is conducted for the implemented and demonstrated attacks using Intrusion Modes and Criticality Analysis (IMECA). By understanding the vulnerabilities and potential consequences of code injection attacks on IoT networks and devices, researchers and practitioners can develop more secure IoT systems and better protect against these emerging threats.

Log poisoning is a cyber-attack where adversaries manipulate systems’ log files to conceal their activities or execute malicious codes. This paper presents a thorough examination of log poisoning attacks, with a focus on demonstrating methodologies applied to prevalent Internet of Things (IoT) platforms, such as the Raspberry Pi. We introduce a novel technique that circumvents the Linux-based devices system’s protective mechanisms which truncate malicious injected code in sensitive log files. Furthermore, a novel persistence technique that allows the attacker to maintain a persistent connection with the Linux-based target device was introduced. Moreover, we propose an evasive technique that enables adversaries to effectively conceal their log poisoning attacks by executing them through encrypted tunnels using a virtual private network (VPN). Through Intrusion Modes and Criticality Analysis (IMECA), we analyze the severity and potential impact of these attacks and propose mitigation strategies to avoid the occurrence of such attacks in order to maintain the confidentiality, integrity, and reliability of IoT ecosystems. As a further step to counteract the threat, we designed a Python script that detects and mitigates log poisoning attacks, specifically against malicious codes that are injected into logs without requiring the log file to be set as executable.