Decision-making involves the selection of one out of many possible courses of action. A decision may bear on other decisions, as when humans seek a second medical opinion before undergoing a risky surgical intervention. These “meta-decisions” are mediated by confidence judgments—the degree to which decision-makers consider that a choice is likely to be correct. We studied how subjective confidence is constructed from noisy sensory evidence. The psychophysical kernels used to convert sensory information into choice and confidence decisions were precisely reconstructed measuring the impact of small fluctuations in sensory input. This is shown in two independent experiments in which human participants made a decision about the direction of motion of a set of randomly moving dots, or compared the brightness of a group of fluctuating bars, followed by a confidence report. The results of both experiments converged to show that: (1) confidence was influenced by evidence during a short window of time at the initial moments of the decision, and (2) confidence was influenced by evidence for the selected choice but was virtually blind to evidence for the non-selected choice. Our findings challenge classical models of subjective confidence—which posit that the difference of evidence in favor of each choice is the seed of the confidence signal.
27 June 2013 in Journal of Neurodevelopmental Disorders
The dimensional approach to autism spectrum disorder (ASD) considers ASD as the extreme of a dimension traversing through the entire population. We explored the potential utility of electroencephalography (EEG) functional connectivity as a biomarker. We hypothesized that individual differences in autistic traits of typical subjects would involve a long-range connectivity diminution within the delta band.
Objectives: Advanced MRI is recommended for the clinical evaluation of patients with coma. However, the implementation of these guidelines has been hindered by an inadequate identification of relevant markers among the vast amount of reported MRI-derived metrics. We developed and validated an innovative and explainable machine learning (ML) analytical pipeline to fill this critical knowledge gap. Design: Prospective cross-sectional study. Setting: Three Intensive Critical Care Units affiliated to the University in Toulouse (France). Patients: Patients with coma (Glasgow Coma Scale score at the hospital admission ≤ 9) from either traumatic or anoxic origin. Patient’s neurologic outcome was assessed at 3 months by using the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised. Whole-brain advanced structural MRI data and functional connectivity analysis of resting-state networks known to contribute to conscious processing. A specifically designed ensemble of explainable ML methods was applied and cross-validated. Interventions: None. Measurement and Main Results: Overall, 64 patients with coma due to either traumatic ( n = 26) or anoxic ( n = 38) brain injuries were studied and compared with 55 controls. The median delay between ICU admission and MRI scan was 9 days (interquartile range, 6–16 d). At 3 months, 50% patients (32/64) had an unfavorable outcome. All the models showed valuable generalization capacities: coma diagnosis (mean accuracy, 0.934%), primary brain injury discrimination (mean accuracy, 0.762 %), and neurologic outcome prediction (mean accuracy, 0.824 %). Conclusions: A new ensemble of brain MRI-derived metrics was specifically related to coma state, its etiology, and the patient’s potential for recovery at 3 months. The structural and functional integrity of mesocircuit and frontoparietal networks appeared to carry the most relevant information.
The high capacity of human iconic memory (IM) has been taken as evidence that visual experience is rich and detailed, as introspection suggests. Opponents to this view argue instead that this impression is illusory, with conscious access being mostly limited to what we can attend to. To provide evidence of either view, in this registered report we compared metacognitive sensitivity levels between IM and working memory (WM) representations. The rationale was that, if pre-attentive IM information is as consciously accessible as attention-bounded WM information, metacognitive sensitivity should be comparable across the two memory systems. Replicating classic findings, our results showed that IM capacity exceeded WM capacity. Nevertheless, and despite matched performance, metacognitive sensitivity was higher in WM. We further examined whether reduced metacognition in IM could be explained by inflation—the tendency to overestimate perceptual richness—by comparing confidence levels across the two memory conditions. Pre-registered analyses showed no evidence of inflation, as IM was associated with lower confidence. Our findings suggest that IM supports identification with less consciously accessible information than WM, challenging rich-view interpretations of conscious perception.