Chemical safety is closely related to public health, safety, and environmental concerns. Strengthening chemical safety supervision is not only vital for ensuring safe production but also plays a crucial role in maintaining overall social safety. This paper aims to analyze the evolutionary game strategies between chemical enterprises and government regulators under different regulatory modes, namely, ‘special rectification’ and ‘normal regulation’. The results indicate that under the ‘special rectification’ pattern, the strategic choices of chemical enterprises regarding safety investment rely on the cost–benefit analysis of safety non-investment. Conversely, in the ‘normal regulation’ mode, the decision to invest in safety is based on the comparison between the cost of safety investment and the cost of not investing in safety. Increasing government sanctions encourages chemical enterprises to prioritize safety investment under both supervision modes. Notably, while punishment significantly impacts safety investment behavior under the ‘normal regulation’ mode, it exhibits negligible influence under the ‘special rectification’ pattern. These research findings provide valuable decision-making support for government agencies tasked with effectively supervising the safety production of chemical enterprises.
Chemical safety is related to public health, safety and environmental concerns, and the dangerous chemicals safety problem is becoming the one that people commonly pay attention to. Strengthening chemical safety supervision not only involves safe production, but also is an important link to maintain social safety. Most related studies focus on chemical safety under normal regulation, this paper addresses the perspective of ‘special rectification’ and ‘normal regulation’, and establishes an evolutionary game model between chemical enterprises and government supervision departments under different supervision modes. Based on the evolutionary game theory, this paper studies the evolution process of the two game players' strategy choices, and compares and analyzes the evolution, stability and equilibrium between the chemical safety and the behavior strategies of government regulatory departments. The model is effectively analyzed based on numerical simulation, and the results show that: Under the ‘special rectification’ mode, the strategic choice of chemical enterprises engaging in safety without investment depends on the difference between the benefits and costs of safety without investment; In the ‘normal regulation’ mode, the choice of its safety non-investment strategy depends on the difference between the cost of engaging in safety investment and the cost of safety non-investment; Increasing the government's punishment will encourage chemical enterprises to take safety investment behavior under the two supervision modes. Increasing the punishment has a significant impact on the safety investment behavior of chemical enterprises under the ‘normal regulation’ mode, but it has no significant impact on the behavior of chemical enterprises under the ‘special rectification’ mode. At the same time, increasing the punishment will inhibit the strict supervision behavior of the government. The research conclusion provides important decision support for government departments to effectively supervise the safety production of chemical enterprises.