Formalisation of informal collectors is beneficial for economical, environmental and social sustainability. Through dividing collectors and recyclers, a benchmark model consists of competitive dual formal and informal channels is established to quantitatively analyse the possibility of formalising informal collectors and study the formalisation extent. This study comprehensively compares the effects of respective subsidy or punishment targeting at collectors or recyclers in the extended policy model. The subsidy delay used to represent the response speed of the subsidy system is first included. This study indicates the influences of different factors on formalisation activity, including bargaining power, reluctance of informal collectors and recycling cost of formal channels. The policy model concluded that the subsidy on informal collectors or formal recyclers (punishment on informal collectors or informal recyclers) presents no difference regarding the formalisation extent. Based on numerical data, we studied the formalisation extent for the context of China and visualised the effects of different policies. The decremental effect of subsidy and the incremental effect of punishment are concluded in a formalisation activity. This study fills the gap of a quantitative study on formalisation activity and the results will comprehend the promotion of the formalisation of informal collectors.

Although sanitary household waste disposal was achieved in China, an efficient source separation system has not been built yet. The Unit Pricing System has been proved effective for household waste sorting by developed countries and regions, while rare developing countries have successfully introduced the system in their local context. The study, taking an interactive perspective of dominant factors of residents’ waste sorting and governments’ intervention, combines theoretical analysis with system simulation to dissect the evolution process of residents’ waste sorting and local governments’ Unit Pricing System policy making, and to provide a Unit Pricing System policy making tool to support policy implementations. The results suggest introducing a Unit Pricing System can significantly push ahead the household waste sorting behaviour for cities with relatively low initial status of environmental awareness, and immediately trigger sorting behaviours for cities with higher initial status of environmental awareness. The study can also benefit other developing countries when imposing waste sorting management instruments.

This paper aims to uncover the spatial distribution of waste mobile phones and perform a preliminary optimization of the location of waste mobile phone recycling centers in China. This study first selects the best-suited among the logistic, Gompertz, and Bass models to forecast the per capita holding quantity of mobile phones. Combined with the population projected by the GM(1,1) and logistic models, the spatial distribution of waste mobile phones is uncovered through the stock-based model. Finally, a mixed-integer programming model is established to optimize the location of recycling centers upon the spatial distribution of waste mobile phones. Accordingly, the logistic model is concluded as the best-suited in terms of forecasting the per capita holding quantity of mobile phones for all 31 provinces in mainland China. The spatial distribution of waste mobile phones indicates the largest number in Guangdong, Shandong, and Jiangsu while the fewest are in Xizang, Qinghai, and Ningxia, in 2016. Furthermore, a remarkable increase in waste mobile phones from 2016 to 2036 in Guangdong and Beijing is projected. The location planning study indicates that a total of 175 recycling centers will be required to cover all waste mobile phones in China in 2036. Guangdong, Beijing and Zhejiang are the top three provinces regarding the number of recycling centers, with 29, 12, and 11 centers, respectively. The authors also propose the effective promoting of waste mobile phone recycling through regional cooperation and the establishment of regional management centers. The results of this study are expected to benefit waste mobile phone recycling in China.

The emerging operating mode of new automobile forces in the context of China brings up new problems for the development of the EV CLSC, which are the market position shift inside the loop and government policy and consumer awareness of changes outside it. Aiming at promoting the development of the EV CLSC, this study integrates the influence of internal and external factors, analyzes their joint impact on the performance of the EV CLSC, and explores the optimal CLSC structure. Specifically, this study develops five game theory models considering different CLSC structures and consumers’ green awareness under government subsidy and varied channel leaderships. Combining theoretical analysis with numerical simulation, the study reveals the performance of the EV CLSC and indicates the optimal CLSC decisions for different players. The result suggests that an EV manufacturer should develop an EV CLSC by itself considering the elimination of double marginalization. When a third-party player is incorporated, the EV manufacturer should undertake the collection effort by itself to optimize the benefit for both the EV manufacturer and the third-party player, especially considering the increasing green awareness of consumers. And a lift of each player’s channel power would always be a wise choice for each other. For the government which has the goals of promoting both the EV industry and the end-of-life treatment of obsolete EVs, a series of trade-offs including the CLSC structure and channel leadership should be considered prudently. This study contributes to the comprehensive understanding of the optimal decisions of the EV CLSC, and will benefit the development of the EV CLSC.