A function computation problem over a directed acyclic network has been considered in the literature, where a sink node is required to compute a target function correctly with the inputs arbitrarily generated at multiple source nodes. The network links are error-free but capacity-limited, and the intermediate nodes perform network coding. The computing rate of a network code is the average number of times that the target function is computed for one use of the network, i.e., each link in the network is used at most once. In the papers [1], [2], two cut-set bounds were proposed on the computing rate. However, we in this paper show that these bounds are not valid for general network function computation problems. We analyze the reason of the invalidity and propose a general cut-set bound by using a new equivalence relation associated with the inputs of the target function. Moreover, some results in [3], [4] were proved by applying the invalid upper bound in [1]. We also justify the validity of these results.

We consider a communication network where there exist wiretappers who can access a subset of channels, called a wiretap set, which is chosen from a given collection of wiretap sets. The collection of wiretap sets can be arbitrary. Secure network coding is applied to prevent the source information from being leaked to the wiretappers. In secure network coding, the required alphabet size is an open problem not only of theoretical interest but also of practical importance, because it is closely related to the implementation of such coding schemes in terms of computational complexity and storage requirement. In this paper, we develop a systematic graph-theoretic approach for improving Cai and Yeung's lower bound on the required alphabet size for the existence of secure network codes. The new lower bound thus obtained, which depends only on the network topology and the collection of wiretap sets, can be significantly smaller than Cai and Yeung's lower bound. A polynomial-time algorithm is devised for efficient computation of the new lower bound.

In future communication applications, users may obtain their messages that have different importance levels distributively from several available sources, such as distributed storage or even devices belonging to other users. This scenario is best modeled by the multilevel diversity coding systems (MDCS). To achieve perfect (information-theoretic) secrecy against wiretap channels, this paper investigates the fundamental limits on the secure rate region of the asymmetric multilevel diversity coding systems (AMDCS), which include the symmetric case as a special case. Threshold perfect secrecy is added to the AMDCS model. The eavesdropper may have access to any one but not more than one subset of the channels but know nothing about the sources, as long as the size of the subset is not above the security level. The question of whether superposition (source separation) coding is optimal for such an AMDCS with threshold perfect secrecy is answered. A class of secure AMDCS (S-AMDCS) with an arbitrary number of encoders is solved and it is shown that linear codes are optimal for this class of instances. However, in contrast with the secure symmetric multilevel diversity coding systems (S-SMDCS), superposition is shown to be not optimal for S-AMDCS in general. In addition, necessary conditions on the existence of a secrecy key are determined as a design guideline.