In this article, we provide a systematic study on the non-zero-sum stochastic differential investment and reinsurance game between two insurance companies. Each insurance company’s surplus process consists of a proportional reinsurance protection and an investment in risky and risk-free assets. Each insurance company is assumed to maximize his utility of the difference between his terminal surplus and that of his competitor. The surplus process of each insurance company is modeled by a mixed regime-switching Cramer–Lundberg diffusion approximation process, i.e. the coefficients of the diffusion risk processes are modulated by a continuous-time Markov chain and an independent market-index process. Correlation between the two surplus processes, independent of the risky asset process, is allowed. Despite the complex structure, we manage to solve the resulting non-zero sum game problem by applying the dynamic programming principle. The Nash equilibrium, the optimal reinsurance/investment, and the resulting value processes of the insurance companies are obtained in closed forms, together with sound economic interpretations, for the case of an exponential utility function.postprin
28 July 2015 in Applied Mathematics & Optimization
In this paper, we consider an $N$-player interacting strategic game in the presence of a (endogenous) dominating player, who gives direct influence on individual agents, through its impact on their control in the sense of Stackelberg game, and then on the whole community. Each individual agent is subject to a delay effect on collecting information, specifically at a delay time, from the dominating player. The size of his delay is completely known by the agent, while to others, including the dominating player, his delay plays as a hidden random variable coming from a common fixed distribution. By invoking a noncanonical fixed point property, we show that for a general class of finite $N$-player games, each of them converges to the mean field counterpart which may possess an optimal solution that can serve as an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium for the corresponding finite $N$-player game. Second, we provide, with explicit solutions, a comprehensive study on the corresponding linear quadratic mean field games of...