Deborah Jean Brown

Prof. Deborah Jean Brown


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

34Years (1993-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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22 June 2006
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DBDeborah Jean Brown
Deborah Jean Brown
Descartes is often accused of having fragmented the human being into two independent substances, mind and body, with no clear strategy for explaining the apparent unity of human experience. Deborah Brown argues that, contrary to this view, Descartes did in fact have a conception of a single, integrated human being, and that in his view this conception is crucial to the success of human beings as rational and moral agents and as practitioners of science. The passions are pivotal in this, and in a rich and wide-ranging discussion she examines Descartes' place in the tradition of thought about the passions, the metaphysics of actions and passions, sensory representation, and Descartes' account of self-mastery and virtue. Her study is an important and original reading not only of Descartes' account of mind-body unity but also of his theory of mind.

1 November 2018 in The Journal of Immunology
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CPClare Pridans
Clare Pridans
ARAnna Raper
Anna Raper
GDGemma M. Davis
Gemma M. Davis
JAJoana Alves
Joana Alves
KSKristin A Sauter
Kristin A Sauter
DHDavid A Hume
David A Hume
We have produced Csf1r-deficient rats by homologous recombination in embryonic stem cells. Consistent with the role of Csf1r in macrophage differentiation, there was a loss of peripheral blood monocytes, microglia in the brain, epidermal Langerhans cells, splenic marginal zone macrophages, bone-associated macrophages and osteoclasts, and peritoneal macrophages. Macrophages of splenic red pulp, liver, lung, and gut were less affected. The pleiotropic impacts of the loss of macrophages on development of multiple organ systems in rats were distinct from those reported in mice. Csf1r−/− rats survived well into adulthood with postnatal growth retardation, distinct skeletal and bone marrow abnormalities, infertility, and loss of visceral adipose tissue. Gene expression analysis in spleen revealed selective loss of transcripts associated with the marginal zone and, in brain regions, the loss of known and candidate novel microglia-associated transcripts. Despite the complete absence of microglia, there was little overt phenotype in brain, aside from reduced myelination and increased expression of dopamine receptor-associated transcripts in striatum. The results highlight the redundant and nonredundant functions of CSF1R signaling and of macrophages in development, organogenesis, and homeostasis.

23 January 2014
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Book Chapter
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DBDeborah Jean Brown
Deborah Jean Brown
The Cambridge Companion to Descartes’ Meditations - January 2014

1 January 2022 in Animal Sentience
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BKBrian Key
Brian Key
DBDeborah Jean Brown
Deborah Jean Brown
How an animal reacts to a sensory stimulus is often used to assess whether that animal can experience feelings such as pain and pleasure. This behavioural path is typically complemented with reference to how a human would normally respond to and experience an analogous stimulus. Together, these approaches can lead to a “hard to imagine otherwise” argument for feelings. It is time to go beyond these qualitative assessments and to now determine whether a nervous system can execute the neural functions necessary for sentience.

20 November 2007
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Book Chapter
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DBDeborah Jean Brown
Deborah Jean Brown

5 May 2021 in Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience
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BKBrian Key
Brian Key
OZOressia Zalucki
Oressia Zalucki
DBDeborah Jean Brown
Deborah Jean Brown
How subjective experience is realized in nervous systems remains one of the great challenges in the natural sciences. An answer to this question should resolve debate about which animals are capable of subjective experience. We contend that subjective experience of sensory stimuli is dependent on the brain’s awareness of its internal neural processing of these stimuli. This premise is supported by empirical evidence demonstrating that disruption to either processing streams or awareness states perturb subjective experience. Given that the brain must predict the nature of sensory stimuli, we reason that conscious awareness is itself dependent on predictions generated by hierarchically organized forward models of the organism’s internal sensory processing. The operation of these forward models requires a specialized neural architecture and hence any nervous system lacking this architecture is unable to subjectively experience sensory stimuli. This approach removes difficulties associated with extrapolations from behavioral and brain homologies typically employed in addressing whether an animal can feel. Using nociception as a model sensation, we show here that theDrosophilabrain lacks the required internal neural connectivity to implement the computations required of hierarchical forward models. Consequently, we conclude thatDrosophila, and those insects with similar neuroanatomy, do not subjectively experience noxious stimuli and therefore cannot feel pain.