Central Asia is a vast geographic region that includes five former Soviet Union republics: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The region has a unique infectious disease burden, and a history that includes Silk Road trade routes and networks that were part of the anti-plague and biowarfare programs in the former Soviet Union. Post Soviet Union biosurveillance research in this unique area of the world has met with several challenges, including lack of funding and resources to independently conduct hypothesis driven, peer-review quality research. Strides have been made, however, to increase scientific engagement and capability. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are examples of countries where biosurveillance research has been successfully conducted, particularly with respect to especially dangerous pathogens. In this review we describe in detail the successes, challenges and opportunities of conducting biosurveillance in Central Asia as exemplified by our recent research activities on ticks and tick-borne diseases in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

High containment biological laboratories (HCBL) are required for work on Risk Group 3 and 4 agents across the spectrum of basic, applied, and translational research. These laboratories include biosafety level (BSL)-3, BSL-4, animal BSL (ABSL)-3, BSL-3-Ag (agriculture livestock), and ABSL-4 laboratories. While SARS-CoV-2 is classified as a Risk Group 3 biological agent, routine diagnostic can be handled at BSL-2. Scenarios involving virus culture, potential exposure to aerosols, divergent high transmissible variants, and zoonosis from laboratory animals require higher BSL-3 measures. Establishing HCBLs especially those at BSL-4 is costly and needs continual investments of resources and funding to sustain labor, equipment, infrastructure, certifications, and operational needs. There are now over 50 BSL-4 laboratories and numerous BSL-3 laboratories worldwide. Besides technical and funding challenges, there are biosecurity and dual-use risks, and local community issues to contend with in order to sustain operations. Here, we describe case histories for distinct HCBLs: representative national centers for diagnostic and reference, nonprofit organizations. Case histories describe capabilities and assess activities during COVID-19 and include capacities, gaps, successes, and summary of lessons learned for future practice.

Mobile and field transportable laboratories have long been used by military and defence, intergovernmental inspections, health, and environmental monitoring agencies. Among the purposes of deploying such laboratories are early warning, forward reconnaissance, on-site investigation, verification, and response. With the advent of technology that has enabled the use of diagnostic equipment in the field and extended transportation capabilities to rapidly deliver these assets and services, mobile and field units have served to further extend networks of existing, fixed laboratories. Case histories of example mobile and field transportable laboratories are compared and discussed including those used by the United States military, Finnish Defence Forces, United Nations, and several mobile and transportable diagnostics laboratories used in response to the 2014 outbreak of Ebola virus in West Africa. Given the often-remote locations to which these laboratories are deployed, they must incorporate a high degree of self-sufficiency, particularly with regard to utilities, and integral biosafety and biosecurity measures. Experienced scientists performing similar technical tasks in fixed laboratories can be employed to support and refine the mobile and field laboratory operations. Mobile and field transportable laboratories are usually national-level assets that require ongoing funding for maintenance, equipping, resupply, and training of personnel in order to maintain a readiness posture for their intended missions. We also examine the cost estimates and sustainment challenges of operating and maintaining these laboratories to provide recommendations and lessons learnt for their practical use and deployment.

Changes in the Earth’s climate and weather continue to impact the planet’s ecosystems, including the interface of infectious disease agents with their hosts and vectors. Environmental disasters, natural and human-made activities raise risk factors that indirectly facilitate infectious disease outbreaks. Subsequently, changes in habitat, displaced populations, and environmental stresses that affect the survival of species are amplified over time. The recurrence and spread of vector-borne (e.g., mosquito, tick, aphid) human, animal, and plant pathogens to new geographic locations are also influenced by climate change. The distribution and range of humans, agricultural animals and plants, wildlife and native plants, as well as vectors, parasites, and microbes that cause neglected diseases of the tropics as well as other global regions are also impacted. In addition, genomic sequencing can now be applied to detect signatures of infectious pathogens as they move into new regions. Molecular detection assays complement metagenomic sequencing to help us understand the microbial community found within the microbiomes of hosts and vectors, and help us uncover mechanistic relationships between climate variability and pathogen transmission. Our understanding of, and responses to, such complex dynamics and their impacts can be enhanced through effective, multi-sectoral One Health engagement coupled with applications of both traditional and novel technologies. Concerted efforts are needed to further harness and leverage technology that can identify and track these impacts of climate changes in order to mitigate and adapt to their effects.

Molecular detection of biological agents in the field has traditionally relied on the use of quantitative real-time PCR (qPCR), which now includes commercially available instruments that can be used in the laboratory or field. Adapting this technology for field-forward applications necessitated innovation to minimize size, weight, and power requirements. Rugged, portable instruments, efficient power sources, freeze-dried reagents, data communications, and standard operating procedures for minimally trained users are some examples of limitations that have been overcome to allow qPCR-based data to be generated at the point of need. Despite the high specificity and sensitivity of qPCR, the assays require a priori sequence-based knowledge of the etiological agent to design and produce specific targeted assays with primers and probes. However, in many cases the etiological agent may not be known and pathogen identification must rely on the use of an untargeted screening method. By extracting, preparing, and sequencing all of the genomic material in a particular sample at once, known as metagenomics, a less biased view of the biological entities in that sample can be ascertained. Using metagenomics methods in the field requires the development and optimization of straightforward sample preparation, sequencing, and bioinformatics workflows reminiscent of the challenges faced during the development of field-forward qPCR 15 years ago. To review the state of qPCR and sequencing in the field, we summarized a panel discussion from the 2019 ASM Biothreats Conference. Our discussion focused on the development, evolution, and comparison of molecular methods for biological agents and their utility in the field.

The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that zoonotic diseases transmitted from animals to humans account for 75 percent of new and emerging infectious diseases. Globally, high-consequence pathogens that impact livestock and have the potential for human transmission create research paradoxes and operational challenges for the high-containment laboratories that conduct work with them. These specialized facilities are required for conducting all phases of research on high-consequence pathogens (basic, applied, and translational) with an emphasis on both the generation of fundamental knowledge and product development. To achieve this research mission, a highly-trained workforce is required and flexible operational methods are needed. In addition, working with certain pathogens requires compliance with regulations such as the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Select Agent regulations, which adds to the operational burden. The vast experience from the existing studies at Plum Island Animal Disease Center, other U.S. laboratories, and those in Europe and Australia with biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) facilities designed for large animals, clearly demonstrates the valuable contribution this capability brings to the efforts to detect, prepare, prevent and respond to livestock and potential zoonotic threats. To raise awareness of these challenges, which include biosafety and biosecurity issues, we held a workshop at the 2018 American Society for Microbiology (ASM) Biothreats conference to further discuss the topic with invited experts and audience participants. The workshop covered the subjects of research funding and metrics, economic sustainment of drug and vaccine development pipelines, workforce turnover, and the challenges of maintaining operational readiness of high containment laboratories.