Morten Storm Overgaard

Prof. Morten Storm Overgaard


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

23Years (2004-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 March 2004 in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
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TRThomas Zoëga Ramsøy
Thomas Zoëga Ramsøy
MOMorten Storm Overgaard
Morten Storm Overgaard

1 December 2010 in Consciousness and Cognition
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Journal Article
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KSKristian Sandberg
Kristian Sandberg
BTBert Timmermans
Bert Timmermans
MOMorten Storm Overgaard
Morten Storm Overgaard
ACAxel Cleeremans
Axel Cleeremans

1 August 2008 in Trends in Cognitive Sciences
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Journal Article
Open access
ASAnil K. Seth
Anil K. Seth
ZDZoltán Dienes
Zoltán Dienes
ACAxel Cleeremans
Axel Cleeremans
MOMorten Storm Overgaard
Morten Storm Overgaard
LPLuiz Pessoa
Luiz Pessoa
The resurgent science of consciousness has been accompanied by a recent emphasis on the problem of measurement. Having dependable measures of consciousness is essential both for mapping experimental evidence to theory and for designing perspicuous experiments. Here, we review a series of behavioural and brain-based measures, assessing their ability to track graded consciousness and clarifying how they relate to each other by showing what theories are presupposed by each. We identify possible and actual conflicts among measures that can stimulate new experiments, and we conclude that measures must prove themselves by iteratively building knowledge in the context of theoretical frameworks. Advances in measuring consciousness have implications for basic cognitive neuroscience, for comparative studies of consciousness and for clinical applications.

1 December 2006 in Consciousness and Cognition
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Journal Article
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MOMorten Storm Overgaard
Morten Storm Overgaard
JRJulian Rote
Julian Rote
KMKim Mouridsen
Kim Mouridsen
TRThomas Zoëga Ramsøy
Thomas Zoëga Ramsøy

21 August 2008 in PLOS ONE
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MOMorten Storm Overgaard
Morten Storm Overgaard
KFKatrin Fehl
Katrin Fehl
KMKim Mouridsen
Kim Mouridsen
BBBo Bergholt
Bo Bergholt
ACAxel Cleeremans
Axel Cleeremans
Blindsight patients, whose primary visual cortex is lesioned, exhibit preserved ability to discriminate visual stimuli presented in their “blind” field, yet report no visual awareness hereof. Blindsight is generally studied in experimental investigations of single patients, as very few patients have been given this “diagnosis”. In our single case study of patient GR, we ask whether blindsight is best described as unconscious vision, or rather as conscious, yet severely degraded vision. In experiment 1 and 2, we successfully replicate the typical findings of previous studies on blindsight. The third experiment, however, suggests that GR's ability to discriminate amongst visual stimuli does not reflect unconscious vision, but rather degraded, yet conscious vision. As our finding results from using a method for obtaining subjective reports that has not previously used in blindsight studies (but validated in studies of healthy subjects and other patients with brain injury), our results call for a reconsideration of blindsight, and, arguably also of many previous studies of unconscious perception in healthy subjects.

19 May 2012 in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
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MOMorten Storm Overgaard
Morten Storm Overgaard
KSKristian Sandberg
Kristian Sandberg
In experimental investigations of consciousness, participants are asked to reflect upon their own experiences by issuing reports about them in different ways. For this reason, a participant needs some access to the content of her own conscious experience in order to report. In such experiments, the reports typically consist of some variety of ratings of confidence or direct descriptions of one's own experiences. Whereas different methods of reporting are typically used interchangeably, recent experiments indicate that different results are obtained with different kinds of reporting. We argue that there is not only a theoretical, but also an empirical difference between different methods of reporting. We hypothesize that differences in the sensitivity of different scales may reveal that different types of access are used to issue direct reports about experiences and metacognitive reports about the classification process.