Phenomenological philosophy was developed by Husserl for the eidetic sciences, which are interested in the general essences or persistent characteristics of things. By contrast, the empirical sciences are sciences of facts, interested in the concrete, singular, contextual and accidental qualities of phenomena. We do not encounter general, pure essences in concrete reality; instead, we meet phenomena, which present themselves as the particular actualisations of the essences. For this reason, it is legitimate to distinguish between the eidetic essence, which is constituted by a set of essential predicates that necessarily belong to the thing, and the essence of the concrete, which is constituted by a set of predicates that characterises that unique and singular thing in the space and time in which it manifests itself. Starting from these considerations, this article presents an original interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenological method to develop an empirical phenomenological theory. The ‘empirical phenomenological method’ (EPM) grounded in this theory will first be described, and two examples of its application, in healthcare and educational research, will then be presented.