Aumann has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event $E$ if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event $E$, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for $E$ \emph{do} coincide? We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for this is the existence of a nonempty \emph{finite} event $F$ with the following two properties. First, it is common knowledge at $F$ that the agents cannot tell whether or not $E$ occurred. Second, this still holds true at $F$, when $F$ itself becomes common knowledge
Ceva’s theorem, which concerns triangles, is a central result of post-Euclidean plane geometry. The three-dimensional generalization of a triangle is a tetrahedron, and the n-dimensional generalization of these is an n-simplex. We extend Ceva’s theorem to n-simplices and in doing so illustrate the considerations and choices that can be made in generalizing from plane geometry to high-dimensional geometries.