Dov Samet

Prof. Dr. Dov Samet


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

18Years (2009-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 March 2012 in Games and Economic Behavior
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZHZiv Hellman
Ziv Hellman
DSDov Samet
Dov Samet

9 May 2011 in Theoretical Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ELEhud Lehrer
Ehud Lehrer
DSDov Samet
Dov Samet
Aumann has shown that agents who have a common prior cannot have common knowledge of their posteriors for event $E$ if these posteriors do not coincide. But given an event $E$, can the agents have posteriors with a common prior such that it is common knowledge that the posteriors for $E$ \emph{do} coincide? We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for this is the existence of a nonempty \emph{finite} event $F$ with the following two properties. First, it is common knowledge at $F$ that the agents cannot tell whether or not $E$ occurred. Second, this still holds true at $F$, when $F$ itself becomes common knowledge

18 February 2009 in Synthese
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Journal Article
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DSDov Samet
Dov Samet

27 April 2021 in The American Mathematical Monthly
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Journal Article
Closed access
DSDov Samet
Dov Samet
Ceva’s theorem, which concerns triangles, is a central result of post-Euclidean plane geometry. The three-dimensional generalization of a triangle is a tetrahedron, and the n-dimensional generalization of these is an n-simplex. We extend Ceva’s theorem to n-simplices and in doing so illustrate the considerations and choices that can be made in generalizing from plane geometry to high-dimensional geometries.

7 March 2022 in Theory and Decision
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Journal Article
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DSDov Samet
Dov Samet
DSDavid Schmeidler
David Schmeidler

14 December 2015 in International Journal of Game Theory
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Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
DSDov Samet
Dov Samet