This paper investigates the impact of cognitive load on the formation and maintenance of cooperation within a public goods game experiment featuring a punishment option. By integrating the experimental designs of prior studies and manipulating cognitive load through the memorization of numbers with varying digits, we reveal that high cognitive load accelerates the breakdown of cooperation, irrespective of the presence of a punishment system. Furthermore, under high cognitive load, participants are more likely to engage in antisocial punishment, while the punishment of free riders remains unaffected. These findings suggest that increased cognitive load depletes the cognitive resources needed for deliberative decision-making, leading to a higher propensity for antisocial punishment. Our study contributes to the literature by demonstrating the significant influence of cognitive load on cooperative behavior and providing new insights into the causes of antisocial punishment.
The effect of social preferences, such as altruism and trust, on economic development is widely recognized. However, the reciprocal impact, i.e., how individuals experience the economic environment and how this shapes their social preferences, has remained largely under-explored. This study sheds light on this reciprocal effect, revealing an intriguing macroeconomic impact on individuals’ social preferences. By harnessing the Global Preference Survey data and a non-linear regression model, our findings highlight an interesting trend: there is a discernible decrease in individuals’ social preference as they experience enhanced economic conditions, and this effect is more pronounced for males. This crucial revelation underscores the importance for researchers and policymakers to take into account the prospective attenuation of social preferences in the pursuit of economic well-being.
This paper investigates how generative AI affects economic valuation and market efficiency through a controlled laboratory experiment (N = 264) featuring a real-effort Principal-Agent task. Using an incentive-compatible Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism, we find that AI availability acts as a powerful market lubricant: Principals significantly increase their willingness to pay (WTP) driven by rational expectations of higher output quality, while Agents lower their willingness to accept (WTA) due to reduced effort costs. These dual shifts expand the bargaining zone, causing contract matching rates to surge from 65.1% to 96.9% and nearly doubling the total economic surplus. However, we also document a robust behavioral friction: Compared to the price of acquiring AI access, agents endowing with AI access demand a 26% premium to relinquish it. These findings demonstrate that while generative AI enhances market efficiency through productivity gains, it is rapidly internalized as a psychological entitlement, creating significant endowment effects that may complicate technology adoption.