The availability of big data and affordable hardware have enabled the applications of deep learning on different tasks. With respect to security, several attempts have been made to transfer deep learning’s application from the domain of image recognition or natural language processing into malware detection. In this study, we propose AdMat - a simple yet effective framework to characterize Android applications by treating them as images. The novelty of our study lies in the construction of an adjacency matrix for each application. These matrices act as “input images” to the Convolutional Neural Network model, allowing it to learn to differentiate benign and malicious apps, as well as malware families. During the experiment, we found that AdMat was able to adapt to a variety of training ratios and achieve the average detection rate of 98.26% in different malware datasets. In classification tasks, it also successfully recognized over 97.00% of different malware families with limited number of training data.
We present an arms race between rooting detection and rooting evasion. We investigate different methods to detect rooted device at both Java and native level and evaluate the counterattack from major hooking tools. To this end, an extensive study of Android rooting has been conducted, which includes the techniques to root the device and make it invisible to the detection of mobile antimalware product. We then analyze the evasion loopholes and in turn enhance our rooting detection tool. We also apply evasion techniques on rooted device and compare our work with 92 popular root checking applications and 18 banking and finance applications. Results show that most of them do not suffice and can be evaded through API hooking or static file renaming. Furthermore, over 28000 Android applications have been analyzed and evaluated in order to diagnose the characteristics of rooting in recent years. Our study shows that rooting has become more and more prevalent as an inevitable trend, and it raises big security concerns regarding detection and evasion. As a proof of concept, we have published our rooting detection application to Google Play Store to demonstrate the work presented in this paper.
Advances in speech synthesis have exposed the vulnerability of spoofing countermeasure (CM) systems. Adversarial attacks exacerbate this problem, mainly due to the reliance of most CM models on deep neural networks. While research on adversarial attacks in anti-spoofing systems has received considerable attention, there is a relative scarcity of studies focused on developing effective defense techniques. In this study, we propose a defense strategy against such attacks by augmenting training data with frequency band-pass filtering and denoising. Our approach aims to limit the impact of perturbation, thereby reducing the susceptibility to adversarial samples. Furthermore, our findings reveal that the use of Max-Feature-Map (MFM) and frequency band-pass filtering provides additional benefits in suppressing different noise types. To empirically validate this hypothesis, we conduct tests on different CM models using adversarial samples derived from the ASVspoof challenge and other well-known datasets. The evaluation results show that such defense mechanisms can potentially enhance the performance of spoofing countermeasure systems.
Recently, intelligent Android malware avoids being analyzed using anti-emulator, anti-debugging, and rooting detection. Existing emulators have problems to be easily detected by malware that check with hardware or sensor information. This paper proposes an efficient analysis system A-Pot, to deal with intelligent Android malware. A-Pot applied the Android container technology. It's made to be similar to a real phone using ARM-based hardware. A-Pot is equipped with sensor modules such as USIM, Bluetooth, and Wi-Fi module. In order to respond to the environment analysis, the properties of the Android OS are made to be the same as the real mobile phone. In addition, A-Pot is designed to connect to a mini base station for supporting SMS and phone calls with the 3G network. Moreover, with the advantages provided by the container technology, A-Pot is able to support non-ADB, non-debuggers, and non-root environments. To prove the efficiency of our platform, we analyzed using intelligent Android malware, antivirus, Google Play apps, and general malware. This model had an operating rate of about 97.36% for 5000 malware. The proposed A-Pot can be efficiently applied to defend against intelligent Android malware analysis.
Developers use their private keys to sign the apps before publishing in Google Play Store, an Official Android Market. These keys must be kept secret as they uniquely identify the authority of a developer. We conduct an investigation on more than 21000 real malware and 1000 benign apps in Google Play Store to justify whether the private keys of these benign apps have been manipulated by malware. As a result, 15 apps are found vulnerable due to the leakage of private keys. We also confirm the attacking technique that uses similar package name in third party apps to lure users to install malware without notice.