Anthelmintic resistance has been increasingly reported in cattle worldwide over the last decade, although reports from Europe are more limited. The objective of the present study was to evaluate the efficacy of injectable formulations of ivermectin and moxidectin at 0.2 mg per kg bodyweight against naturally acquired gastro-intestinal nematodes in cattle. A total of 753 animals on 40 farms were enrolled in Germany (12 farms), the UK (10 farms), Italy (10 farms), and France (8 farms). Animals were selected based on pre-treatment faecal egg counts and were allocated to one of the two treatment groups. Each treatment group consisted of between 7 and 10 animals. A post-treatment faecal egg count was performed 14 days (±2 days) after treatment. The observed percentage reduction was calculated for each treatment group based on the arithmetic mean faecal egg count before and after treatment. The resistance status was evaluated based on the reduction in arithmetic mean faecal egg count and both the lower and upper 95% confidence limits. A decreased efficacy was observed in half or more of the farms in Germany, France and the UK. For moxidectin, resistance was confirmed on 3 farms in France, and on 1 farm in Germany and the UK. For ivermectin, resistance was confirmed on 3 farms in the UK, and on 1 farm in Germany and France. The remaining farms with decreased efficacy were classified as having an inconclusive resistance status based on the available data. After treatment Cooperia spp. larvae were most frequently identified, though Ostertagia ostertagi was also found, in particular within the UK and Germany. The present study reports lower than expected efficacy for ivermectin and moxidectin (based on the reduction in egg excretion after treatment) on European cattle farms, with confirmed anthelmintic resistance on 12.5% of the farms.

SARS coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) continues to evolve and new variants emerge. Using nationwide Danish data, we estimate the transmission dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 Omicron subvariants BA.1 and BA.2 within households. Among 22,678 primary cases, we identified 17,319 secondary infections among 50,588 household contacts during a 1–7 day follow-up. The secondary attack rate (SAR) was 29% and 39% in households infected with Omicron BA.1 and BA.2, respectively. BA.2 was associated with increased susceptibility of infection for unvaccinated household contacts (Odds Ratio (OR) 1.99; 95%–CI 1.72-2.31), fully vaccinated contacts (OR 2.26; 95%–CI 1.95–2.62) and booster-vaccinated contacts (OR 2.65; 95%–CI 2.29–3.08), compared to BA.1. We also found increased infectiousness from unvaccinated primary cases infected with BA.2 compared to BA.1 (OR 2.47; 95%–CI 2.15–2.84), but not for fully vaccinated (OR 0.66; 95%–CI 0.57–0.78) or booster-vaccinated primary cases (OR 0.69; 95%–CI 0.59–0.82). Omicron BA.2 is inherently more transmissible than BA.1. Its immune-evasive properties also reduce the protective effect of vaccination against infection, but do not increase infectiousness of breakthrough infections from vaccinated individuals.

In late 2021, the Omicron SARS-CoV-2 variant overtook the previously dominant Delta variant, but the extent to which this transition was driven by immune evasion or a change in the inherent transmissibility is currently unclear. We estimate SARS-CoV-2 transmission within Danish households during December 2021. Among 26,675 households (8,568 with the Omicron VOC), we identified 14,140 secondary infections within a 1–7-day follow-up period. The secondary attack rate was 29% and 21% in households infected with Omicron and Delta, respectively. For Omicron, the odds of infection were 1.10 (95%-CI: 1.00-1.21) times higher for unvaccinated, 2.38 (95%-CI: 2.23-2.54) times higher for fully vaccinated and 3.20 (95%-CI: 2.67-3.83) times higher for booster-vaccinated contacts compared to Delta. We conclude that the transition from Delta to Omicron VOC was primarily driven by immune evasiveness and to a lesser extent an inherent increase in the basic transmissibility of the Omicron variant.

1 The Omicron SARS-CoV-2 variant of concern (VOC lineage B.1.1.529), which became dominant in many countries during early 2022, includes several subvariants with strikingly different genetic characteristics. Several countries, including Denmark, have observed the two Omicron subvariants: BA.1 and BA.2. In Denmark the latter has rapidly replaced the former as the dominant subvariant. Based on nationwide Danish data, we estimate the transmission dynamics of BA.1 and BA.2 following the spread of Omicron VOC within Danish households in late December 2021 and early January 2022. Among 8,541 primary household cases, of which 2,122 were BA.2, we identified a total of 5,702 secondary infections among 17,945 potential secondary cases during a 1-7 day follow-up period. The secondary attack rate (SAR) was estimated as 29% and 39% in households infected with Omicron BA.1 and BA.2, respectively. We found BA.2 to be associated with an increased susceptibility of infection for unvaccinated individuals (Odds Ratio (OR) 2.19; 95%-CI 1.58-3.04), fully vaccinated individuals (OR 2.45; 95%-CI 1.77-3.40) and booster-vaccinated individuals (OR 2.99; 95%-CI 2.11-4.24), compared to BA.1. We also found an increased transmissibility from unvaccinated primary cases in BA.2 households when compared to BA.1 households, with an OR of 2.62 (95%-CI 1.96-3.52). The pattern of increased transmissibility in BA.2 households was not observed for fully vaccinated and booster-vaccinated primary cases, where the OR of transmission was below 1 for BA.2 compared to BA.1. We conclude that Omicron BA.2 is inherently substantially more transmissible than BA.1, and that it also possesses immune-evasive properties that further reduce the protective effect of vaccination against infection, but do not increase its transmissibility from vaccinated individuals with breakthrough infections.

1 The Omicron variant of concern (VOC) is a rapidly spreading variant of SARS-CoV-2 that is likely to overtake the previously dominant Delta VOC in many countries by the end of 2021. We estimated the transmission dynamics following the spread of Omicron VOC within Danish households during December 2021. We used data from Danish registers to estimate the household secondary attack rate (SAR). Among 11,937 households (2,225 with the Omicron VOC), we identified 6,397 secondary infections during a 1-7 day follow-up period. The SAR was 31% and 21% in households with the Omicron and Delta VOC, respectively. We found an increased transmission for unvaccinated individuals, and a reduced transmission for booster-vaccinated individuals, compared to fully vaccinated individuals. Comparing households infected with the Omicron to Delta VOC, we found an 1.17 (95%-CI: 0.99-1.38) times higher SAR for unvaccinated, 2.61 times (95%-CI: 2.34-2.90) higher for fully vaccinated and 3.66 (95%-CI: 2.65-5.05) times higher for booster-vaccinated individuals, demonstrating strong evidence of immune evasiveness of the Omicron VOC. Our findings confirm that the rapid spread of the Omicron VOC primarily can be ascribed to the immune evasiveness rather than an inherent increase in the basic transmissibility.

The faecal egg count reduction test (FECRT) is the primary diagnostic tool used for detecting anthelmintic resistance at the farm level. It is therefore extremely important that the experimental design of a FECRT and the susceptibility classification of the result use standardised and statistically rigorous methods. Several different approaches for improving the analysis of FECRT data have been proposed, but little work has been published on how to address the issue of prospective sample size calculations. Here, we provide a complete and detailed overview of the quantitative issues relevant to a FECRT starting from basic statistical principles. We then present a new approach for determining sample size requirements for the FECRT that is built on a solid statistical framework, and provide a rigorous anthelminthic drug efficacy classification system for use with FECRT in livestock. Our approach uses two separate statistical tests, a one-sided inferiority test for resistance and a one-sided non-inferiority test for susceptibility, and determines a classification of resistant, susceptible or inconclusive based on the combined result. Since this approach is based on two independent one-sided tests, we recommend that a 90 % CI be used in place of the historically used 95 % CI. This maintains the desired Type I error rate of 5 %, and simultaneously reduces the required sample size. We demonstrate the use of this framework to provide sample size calculations that are rooted in the well-understood concept of statistical power. Tailoring to specific host/parasite systems is possible using typical values for expected pre-treatment and post-treatment variability in egg counts as well as within-animal correlation in egg counts. We provide estimates for these parameters for ruminants, horses and swine based on a re-examination of datasets that were available to us from a combination of published data and other sources. An illustrative example is provided to demonstrate the use of the framework, and parameter estimates are presented to estimate the required sample size for a hypothetical FECRT using ivermectin in cattle. The sample size calculation method and classification framework presented here underpin the sample size recommendations provided in the upcoming FECRT WAAVP guidelines for detection of anthelmintic resistance in ruminants, horses, and swine, and have also been made freely available as open-source software via our website (https://www.fecrt.com).