Pablo Guillen

Dr. Pablo Guillen


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 January 2018 in European Economic Review
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PGPablo Guillen
Pablo Guillen
RHRustamdjan Hakimov
Rustamdjan Hakimov

19 August 2020 in Experimental Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
PGPablo Guillen
Pablo Guillen
RVRobert Veszteg
Robert Veszteg
We introduce two novel matching mechanisms, Reverse Top Trading Cycles (RTTC) and Reverse Deferred Acceptance (RDA), with the purpose of challenging the idea that the theoretical property of strategy-proofness induces high rates of truth-telling in economic experiments. RTTC and RDA are identical to the celebrated Top Trading Cycles (TTC) and Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanisms, respectively, in all their theoretical properties except that their dominant-strategy equilibrium is to report one’s preferences in the order opposite to the way they were induced. With the focal truth-telling strategy being out of equilibrium, we are able to perform a clear measurement of how much of the truth-telling reported for strategy-proof mechanisms is compatible with rational behaviour and how much of it is caused by confused decision-makers following a default, focal strategy without understanding the structure of the game. In a school-allocation setting, we find that roughly half of the observed truth-telling under TTC and DA is the result of naïve (non-strategic) behaviour. Only 14–31% of the participants choose actions in RTTC and RDA that are compatible with rational behaviour. Furthermore, by looking at the responses of those seemingly rational participants in control tasks, it becomes clear that most lack a basic understanding of the incentives of the game. We argue that the use of a default option, confusion and other behavioural biases account for the vast majority of truthful play in both TTC and DA in laboratory experiments.

31 May 2020
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
PGPablo Guillen
Pablo Guillen
UKUrša Komac
Urša Komac

31 May 2020
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
PGPablo Guillen
Pablo Guillen
UKUrša Komac
Urša Komac

1 January 2013 in Comparative Sociology
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
SBSalvatore Babones
Salvatore Babones
PBPhilipp Babcicky
Philipp Babcicky
PGPablo Guillen
Pablo Guillen
: Over the past thirty years the spread of neoliberal ideology has put collective mechanisms for the social regulation of labor markets under severe stress. On the other hand, social norms of fairness, particularly with regard to rewards for work, are very strong. We argue that neoliberal practices have spread less widely and deeply than is commonly imagined. We use ICTWSS data for 34 OECD countries to construct an index of corporatism for each country and a cross-national average for countries in each of six welfare models. Over the period 1960–2010 corporatism declines dramatically in Anglo-Saxon countries but converges to the Continental European mean for the three main groups of European countries. This circumstantial evidence suggests that norms of fairness in the social regulation of labor markets are at least resilient to the encroachment of neoliberal labor market practices.

31 May 2020
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
PGPablo Guillen
Pablo Guillen
UKUrša Komac
Urša Komac