During 2021 and 2022 High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza (HPAI) killed thousands of wild birds across Europe and North America, suggesting a change in infection dynamics and a shift to new hosts, including seabirds. Northern Gannets Morus bassanus appeared to be especially severely impacted, but a detailed account of the data available is required to help understand how the HPAI virus (HPAIV) spread across the meta‐population, and the ensuing demographic consequences. Accordingly, we analyse information on confirmed and suspected HPAIV outbreaks across most North Atlantic Gannet colonies and, for the largest colony (Bass Rock, UK), provide impacts on population size, breeding success, and preliminary results on apparent adult survival and serology. Unusually high numbers of dead Gannets were first noted at colonies in Iceland during April 2022. Outbreaks in May occurred in many Scottish colonies, followed by colonies in Canada, Germany and Norway. By the end of June, outbreaks had occurred in colonies in Canada and the English Channel. Outbreaks in 12 UK and Ireland colonies appeared to follow a clockwise pattern with the last infected colonies recorded in late August/September. Unusually high mortality was recorded at 40 colonies (75% of global total colonies). Dead birds testing positive for HPAIV H5N1 were associated with 58% of these colonies. At Bass Rock, the number of occupied nest‐sites decreased by at least 71%, breeding success declined by c. 66% compared with the long‐term UK mean and the resighting of marked individuals suggested that apparent adult survival between 2021 and 2022 could have been substantially lower than the preceding 10‐year average. Serological investigation detected antibodies specific to H5 in apparently healthy birds, indicating that some Gannets recover from HPAIV infection. Further, most of these recovered birds had black irises, suggestive of a phenotypic indicator of previous infection. Untangling the impacts of HPAIV infection from other challenges faced by seabirds is key to establishing effective conservation strategies for threatened seabird populations as the likelihood of further epizootics increases, due to increasing habitat loss and the industrialization of poultry production.

The UK and Europe have seen successive outbreaks of highly pathogenic avian influenza across the 2020/21 and 2021/22 autumn/winter seasons. Understanding both the epidemiology and transmission of these viruses in different species is critical to aid mitigating measures where outbreaks cause extensive mortalities in both land- and waterfowl. Infection of different species can result in mild or asymptomatic outcomes, or acute infections that result in high morbidity and mortality levels. Definition of disease outcome in different species is of great importance to understanding the role different species play in the maintenance and transmission of these pathogens. Further, the infection of species that have conservation value is also important to recognise and characterise to understand the impact on what might be limited wild populations. Highly pathogenic avian influenza virus H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b has been detected in great skuas (Stercorarius skua) across different colonies on islands off the shore of Scotland, Great Britain during summer 2021. A large number of great skuas were observed as developing severe clinical disease and dying during the epizootic and mortalities were estimated to be high where monitored. Of eight skuas submitted for post-mortem examination, seven were confirmed as being infected with this virus using a range of diagnostic assays. Here we overview the outbreak event that occurred in this species, listed as species of conservation concern in Great Britain and outline the importance of this finding with respect to virus transmission and maintenance.

Ferrets were experimentally inoculated with SARS-CoV-2 (severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)-related coronavirus 2) to assess infection dynamics and host response. During the resulting subclinical infection, viral RNA was monitored between 2 and 21 days post-inoculation (dpi), and reached a peak in the upper respiratory cavity between 4 and 6 dpi. Viral genomic sequence analysis in samples from three animals identified the Y453F nucleotide substitution relative to the inoculum. Viral RNA was also detected in environmental samples, specifically in swabs of ferret fur. Microscopy analysis revealed viral protein and RNA in upper respiratory tract tissues, notably in cells of the respiratory and olfactory mucosae of the nasal turbinates, including olfactory neuronal cells. Antibody responses to the spike and nucleoprotein were detected from 21 dpi, but virus-neutralizing activity was low. A second intranasal inoculation (re-exposure) of two ferrets after a 17-day interval did not produce re-initiation of viral RNA shedding, but did amplify the humoral response in one animal. Therefore, ferrets can be experimentally infected with SARS-CoV-2 to model human asymptomatic infection.

The long-term control strategy of SARS-CoV-2 and other major respiratory viruses needs to include antivirals to treat acute infections, in addition to the judicious use of effective vaccines. Whilst COVID-19 vaccines are being rolled out for mass vaccination, the modest number of antivirals in use or development for any disease bears testament to the challenges of antiviral development. We recently showed that non-cytotoxic levels of thapsigargin (TG), an inhibitor of the sarcoplasmic/endoplasmic reticulum (ER) Ca²⁺ ATPase pump, induces a potent host innate immune antiviral response that blocks influenza A virus replication. Here we show that TG is also highly effective in blocking the replication of respiratory syncytial virus (RSV), common cold coronavirus OC43, SARS-CoV-2 and influenza A virus in immortalized or primary human cells. TG’s antiviral performance was significantly better than remdesivir and ribavirin in their respective inhibition of OC43 and RSV. Notably, TG was just as inhibitory to coronaviruses (OC43 and SARS-CoV-2) and influenza viruses (USSR H1N1 and pdm 2009 H1N1) in separate infections as in co-infections. Post-infection oral gavage of acid-stable TG protected mice against a lethal influenza virus challenge. Together with its ability to inhibit the different viruses before or during active infection, and with an antiviral duration of at least 48 h post-TG exposure, we propose that TG (or its derivatives) is a promising broad-spectrum inhibitor against SARS-CoV-2, OC43, RSV and influenza virus.

Since October 2021, Europe has experienced the largest avian influenza virus (AIV) epizootic, caused by clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 high pathogenicity AIV (HPAIV), with over 284 poultry infected premises (IPs) and 2480 dead H5N1-positive wild birds detected in Great Britain alone. Many IPs have presented as geographical clusters, raising questions about the lateral spread between premises by airborne particles. Airborne transmission over short distances has been observed for some AIV strains. However, the risk of airborne spread of this strain remains to be elucidated. We conducted extensive sampling from IPs where clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIVs were confirmed during the 2022/23 epizootic, each representing a major poultry species (ducks, turkeys, and chickens). A range of environmental samples were collected inside and outside houses, including deposited dust, feathers, and other potential fomites. Viral RNA (vRNA) and infectious viruses were detected in air samples collected from inside and outside but in close proximity to infected houses, with vRNA alone being detected at greater distances (≤10 m) outside. Some dust samples collected outside of the affected houses contained infectious viruses, while feathers from the affected houses, located up to 80 m away, only contained vRNA. Together, these data suggest that airborne particles harboring infectious HPAIV can be translocated short distances (<10 m) through the air, while macroscopic particles containing vRNA might travel further (≤80 m). Therefore, the potential for airborne transmission of clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 HPAIV between premises is considered low. Other factors, including indirect contact with wild birds and the efficiency of biosecurity, represent greater importance in disease incursion.

In December 2022 and January 2023, we isolated clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 high-pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses from six American crows (Corvus brachyrhynchos) from Prince Edward Island and a red fox (Vulpes vulpes) from Newfoundland, Canada. Using full-genome sequencing and phylogenetic analysis, these viruses were found to fall into two distinct phylogenetic clusters: one group containing H5N1 viruses that had been circulating in North and South America since late 2021, and the other one containing European H5N1 viruses reported in late 2022. The transatlantic re-introduction for the second time by pelagic/Icelandic bird migration via the same route used during the 2021 incursion of Eurasian origin H5N1 viruses into North America demonstrates that migratory birds continue to be the driving force for transcontinental dissemination of the virus. This new detection further demonstrates the continual long-term threat of H5N1 viruses for poultry and mammals and the subsequent impact on various wild bird populations wherever these viruses emerge. The continual emergence of clade 2.3.4.4b H5Nx viruses requires vigilant surveillance in wild birds, particularly in areas of the Americas, which lie within the migratory corridors for long-distance migratory birds originating from Europe and Asia. Although H5Nx viruses have been detected at higher rates in North America since 2021, a bidirectional flow of H5Nx genes of American origin viruses to Europe has never been reported. In the future, coordinated and systematic surveillance programs for HPAI viruses need to be launched between European and North American agencies.