This study examined the performances of three groups of participants in interpreting metaphors in three different conditions: congruent gesture-prime conditions, opposite gesture-prime conditions, and no-prime conditions. In congruent gesture-prime conditions, each metaphor was preceded by the congruent gestural representation of metaphor schema. In opposite gesture-prime conditions, each metaphor was preceded by the opposite gestural representation of metaphor schema. The results showed that participants of congruent gesture-prime conditions had the best performance in interpreting metaphors, while participants of opposite gesture-prime conditions had the worst performance. It is suggested that metaphor schema is an important part of metaphorical meaning of a metaphor. Therefore, when this part of meaning is activated by a gestural prime, metaphor comprehension is facilitated. Furthermore, when a schema is used to metaphorically describe a concept or an event, that schema and the neural network that represents it become one part of a larger interconnected neural network that represents the meaning of the metaphor. It could mean that the activation of one part of it could facilitate the activation of the whole of the network. Finally, it is emphasized that a gesture that depicts the schema of a metaphor is in fact the embodied realization of that metaphor.

This paper presents a review of studies that have provided evidence supporting metaphorical embodiment. These studies are divided into three categories of behavioral, neuroimaging, and corpus studies. After summing up the findings of these studies, it is concluded that metaphorical embodiment is supported by these three lines of research. This is followed by a review of a number of studies that have measured sensorimotor and action effector strengths of various concepts. Then, the idea of sensorimotor and action effector strength of concepts is linked to metaphorical embodiment to present the main idea of the paper. Based on the findings of studies that have measured sensorimotor and action effector strengths of concepts, it is suggested that the degree of involvement of sensorimotor systems in mental simulation of metaphoric actions may not be at the same level in all metaphors. It depends on the sensorimotor strength of the base of the metaphor in various modalities. If the base of a metaphor has a high degree of perceptual strength in a certain modality, that modality plays the most important role in the processing of that metaphor, while other modalities take less important roles. In other words, depending on the sensorimotor strengths of the base of a metaphor in various modalities, those modalities have various levels of importance in the processing of that metaphor. If the base of the metaphor is weak in all modalities, modal resources can come into play to process that metaphor.

The way and degree to which people in different cultures consider a metaphor to be appropriate, acceptable, or apt has been the subject of controversy in recent decades. According to structure-mapping models, metaphors are understood by mapping relations from the base domain to relations in the target domain. However, previous research lacks literature on cross-cultural contexts and differences in the degree of acceptability of metaphors in different cultures. To address this gap, in this study we examined cross-cultural differences in metaphor aptness among participants from three different cultures. We developed two questionnaires, an acceptability judgment-task and a parallel-relation test using the COCA (English), PLDB (Persian), and KorAP (German) corpus databases. The results suggest striking differences in the acceptance of a metaphor in different cultures where the vehicle of a metaphor is not present. It is suggested that metaphors are considered apt through the process of categorizing the salient features that are considered structurally similar. This idea is partially consistent with studies that support class-inclusion models which suggest that hearers place the topic of a metaphor in a category in which the vehicle fits. The absence of a domain (whether topic or vehicle) may lead to unacceptability of a metaphor. Lack of cultural background in the use of these words hinders the process of finding a salient feature between them and the counter domain in a metaphor to form an appropriate alignment.

This study measured hand and head action strengths of eight typical emotional states using an authentic but implicit emotion elicitation task. Participants listened to and then retold five stories in which eight typical emotional states were experienced by the narrators. The number of hand and head gestures that occur naturally while experiencing an emotional state was used as an index to determine the hand and head action strength of that emotional state. Results showed a larger number of head gestures than hand gestures, suggesting that head action strengths of the eight emotional states are stronger than their hand action strengths. These findings are consistent with the data extracted from Lancaster Sensorimotor Norms (LSN), although the two sets of data were gathered in two completely different experimental conditions and in two different languages. Furthermore, our data showed a prototypical directionality effect for the typical emotional states, specifically, happiness, anger and pride were primarily accompanied by upward gestures but downward gestures for sadness and shame; surprise was primarily accompanied by forward gestures but backward gestures for fear and disgust.