Purpose: – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs) compensation and corporate governance practices of publicly listed companies in New Zealand for the period 2005-2010.Design/methodology/approach: – Prior literature argues that corporate governance systems and structures are heterogeneous, that is, corporate governance mechanisms that are important tend to be specific to a country and its institutional structures. The two corporate governance mechanisms most important for monitoring CEO compensation are ownership structure and board structure. The authors use a generalised least squares regression estimation technique to examine the effect ownership structure and board structure has on CEO compensation, and examine whether ownership structure, board structure, CEO and director compensation have an effect on company performance.Findings: – After controlling for size, performance, industry and year effects, the authors report that internal features rather than external features of corporate governance practices influence CEO compensation. Companies that have their CEO on the board pay them more than those who do not sit on the board, suggesting CEOs on boards have power to influence board decisions and therefore boards become less effective in monitoring CEO compensation in the New Zealand context. Companies that pay their directors more tend to reward their CEOs more as well, thus supporting the managerial entrenchment hypothesis.Research limitations/implications: – The results confirm the findings reported in prior studies that institutional investors are ineffective in monitoring managerial decisions and their focus is on decisions that benefit them on a short-term basis.Practical implications: – The findings indicate that although the proportion of independent directors on boards does not significantly influence CEO compensation, it does indicate that outside directors are passive and are no more effective than insiders when it comes to the oversight and supervision of CEO compensation.Originality/value: – Being a small and open financial market with many small- and medium-sized listed companies, New Zealand differs from large economies such as the UK and the USA in the sense that CEOs in New Zealand tend to be closely connected to each other. As such, the relationship between pay-performance for New Zealand is found to be different from those reported for the UK and the USA. In New Zealand, the proportion of institutional and/or block shareholders is positively associated with CEO compensation and negatively associated with company performance, suggesting that it is not an effective mechanism for monitoring CEO compensation.

Corporate governance (CG) is often split among rule and principle-based methods to regulation in distinctive institutional contexts. Relying on an alternative theoretical framework (i.e. institutional theory), rather than the dominant agency theory, this study conceptualizes corporate governance practices and structures as institutionally resolute and directed and explores the key institutional determinants of good CG practices in an emerging economy. Drawing on qualitative and quantitative methods, this study conducted semi-structured interviews from eight CG professionals, followed by a survey questionnaire (N=105) from PSX listed firms. The study explores the extent to which certain underlying formal and informal institutional determinants, such as the auditing, political, legal, board, shareholders awareness, voting, culture, and values play a determining role in corporate governance. Using exploratory factor analysis, this study identified five major barriers, i.e. firm-level barriers, external barriers, social barriers, education and training barriers and legal barriers which restrain good CG practices in Pakistan. In addition, this study identified four major drivers, i.e. internal drivers, regulatory drivers, motivational drivers and collaborative drivers which can promote good CG practices in Pakistan. The findings of multiple hierarchical regression analysis revealed that the CGI score has a significant positive relationship with both return on assets and return on equity. This study emphasizes the necessity to revisit the foundation of institutional and agency theories in the environment of developing countries.

Investor sentiment is an important aspect of behavioural finance, which provides explanation of anomalies to the asset’s intrinsic values. Sentiments can easily affect individual investors. Historically, Australia is regarded as rich in resources but poor in capital, and this motivates the paper to further study and compare the effects of investor sentiment on performance returns. Aggregate and cross-sectional effects, as well as predictive regression analysis to forecast the relationships, while controlling for the macroeconomic variables, are used by employing Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) and trade volume as sentiment proxies. Contrary to some studies with aggregate stock markets, it is discovered that in the short term, investor sentiment poses a positive impact with strong predictive power on the forecast of portfolio returns but not so much in the long run, which supports the classical theories of rational investors. In both Australian and New Zealand markets, the sentiment proxies also cannot predict the returns portfolios with dividends in the long/short portfolio and book-to-market ratio long/short portfolio.

The aim of this study is to examine the relationship between corporate governance (CG), in terms of its internal significance, and cost of capital (COC), based on a sample of listed firms of Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) over the period of 2009–2015. We used Pakistan as a case study mainly because we expect that key features of Pakistani setting in terms of CG and financial markets will have impact on the relationship between CG and COC. Drawing on a sample of 120 PSX listed firms, we find that CG compliance and disclosure (CG index [CGI]) has improved over time among PSX listed firms. The findings also reveal a positive relationship of institutional, government and director ownership with both CGI and COC, while this relationship becomes negative with block ownership. The findings of 2SLS reveal a significant negative association between CG compliance and COC; hence, firms with higher CG score enjoy a lower COC. Interestingly, gender diversity and board size have a negative association with CG compliance and COC, while audit firm size reveals a positive association with CG compliance and disclosure while a negative association with COC. The study contributes to existing literature dealing with CG and determinant of firm value (COC) in emerging markets, particularly in Pakistan, which has not been extensively explored in existing research.