The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) practices on banks’ reputation and market performance. In particular, we aim to analyse whether banks adopting ESG-compliant practices can reduce their reputational damage due to financial sanctions and increase their market performance. In order to demonstrate the effect of banks’ ESG practices in reducing reputational damage due to financial penalties imposed by supervisors for breaches of regulatory requirements, we analyze a sample of 21 banks — selected because of the availability of information on sanctions imposed by the supervisory authorities — by applying a pre-selection model based on the trend of historical returns. With reference to the selected sample, we verify the percentage of securities characterized by different levels of sanctions and different ESG scores. Overall, we find that ESG aspects have a positive impact on stock performance, although higher ESG scores do not, per se, mean a lower probability of sanctions. Differing from previous research, our study, by focusing on financial sanctions, provides useful insights concerning the ESG impact on both market performance and reputational aspects.

The aim of this paper is to provide evidence on the effectiveness of the current state support mechanism incentive adopted by the Italian government in the wind market. In particular, this paper intends to investigate the effectiveness of the auction mechanism as an incentive tool for renewable sources as required by the transposition of Directive 2009/28/EC. In order to demonstrate the economic and financial feasibility of a typical wind-sector investment, we performed a scenario analysis (Monte Carlo simulation) determining a 52,500 Net Present Value (NPV) by varying the key underlying variables of the investment. The results show that with the mechanism currently in place the percentage of positive leveraged NPV is approximately equal to 70%. Despite the state contribution provided through the “Feed-in tariff” mechanism, the profitability of wind projects is not always successful, and this problem could be amplified by the slowness of the authorization procedures. The article offers prime reflections for scholars and policy makers who have long been committed to promoting sustainable development and important considerations on the introduction of further incentive models.

Credit institutions often refuse to lend money to small firms. Usually, this happens because small firms are not able to provide collateral to lenders. Moreover, given the small amount of required loans, the relative cost of full monitoring is too high for lenders. Group lending contracts have been viewed as an effective solution to credit rationing of small firms in both developing and industrialized countries. The aim of this paper is to highlight the potential of group lending contracts in terms of credit risk management. In particular, this paper provides a theoretical explanation of the potential of group lending programs in screening good borrowers from bad ones to reduce the incidence of non-performing-loans (NPL). This paper shows that the success of firms involved in selected group lending programs is due to the fact that co-signature is an effective screening device: more precisely, if lenders make a proper use of co-signature to screen good firms from bad ones, then only firms that are good ex-ante enter group lending contracts. So, the main argument of this paper is that well designed group lending programs induce good firms to become jointly liable, at least partially, with other good firms and discourage other – bad-firms to do the same. Specifically, co-signature is proven to be a screening device only in the case of a perfectly competitive bank sector.