The Chinese national government and local governments have introduced multiple incentive measures to increase the market share of new energy vehicles (NEVs), such as dual credit policy, financial subsidies, and building new charging infrastructures. However, the government's budget to support the development of NEVs is limited. In this paper, we consider a duopolistic market consisting of a gasoline vehicle (GV) firm and an electric vehicle (EV) firm and develop a multi-level game-theoretic model based on the fact that the Chinese government seeks to achieve a given market share target with the minimum expenditure. A comparison of the equilibrium results in three incentive schemes differentiated by the financial subsidy is conducted to investigate the effectiveness of various incentive schemes. Furthermore, we consider a real situation in China that the government attempts to achieve a target for the total number of charging infrastructures through a reasonable policy design. The results in this study reveal that, with the EV market share target in mind, raising the requirements of dual credit policy has no effect on the EV firm's profit under EV purchase subsidy, is beneficial to the EV firm's profit under construction cost sharing subsidy, and is detrimental to the EV firm's profit under per-unit construction subsidy. It is worthwhile for the government to subsidize for infrastructure construction effort rather than consumers' purchase cost. Given a target for the total number of charging infrastructures, construction cost sharing subsidy can provide more motivation for the EV firm to build charging infrastructures than per-unit construction subsidy.

Crowdsourcing contest platforms provide enterprises with opportunities to seek external resources at a lower cost. Increasing the participation of solvers is the key to improving the success of crowdsourcing contests. Many previous studies attempt to use participation intention as a proxy for exploring participation behavior, using surveys to examine participation intention or continued participation intention. However, participation intention and participation behavior differ significantly, and the dynamic nature of influencing factors has a more complex effect on solvers’ participation. Therefore, based on social exchange theory, we use the dynamic data of winvk.com to construct a two-stage model of view and submission. The effect of dynamic competition on participation intention and participation behavior is explored. The results show that external competition has a consistent negative effect on both participation intention and participation behavior. However, the effect of internal competition is different. It has no significant effect on participation intention, but has a significant positive effect on participation behavior. In addition, rewards exacerbate the effect of competition on participation behavior. These findings provide empirical evidence for exploring differences in participation intention and behavior, and offer practical suggestions for enterprises and platforms to improve solvers’ participation in a short time.