Umar Butt

Dr. Umar Butt

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

16Years (2011-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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7 July 2013 in International Advances in Economic Research
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TCTrevor William Chamberlain
Trevor William Chamberlain
UBUmar Butt
Umar Butt
SSSudipto Sarkar
Sudipto Sarkar

26 August 2019 in International Journal of Managerial Finance
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UBUmar Butt
Umar Butt
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to identify the impact of governance structures in defining the relationship between profits and leverage.Design/methodology/approach: The paper uses the standard design used by Fama and French (2002) and employs it under different governance structures. It is the first to identify the endogenous nature of the relationship between profits and leverage, compounded by the endogeneity of governance. The paper uses the instrumental variable (IV) technique to control for endogeneity and recommends a novel approach to control for multiple endogenous regressors.Findings: The results demonstrate that firms operating under good governance verify the predictions of the trade-off theory of capital structure and that the evidence of negative relation in the literature is a subset of management inefficiency. The results are consistent after controlling for endogeneity and are robust to alternative iteration of governance. The activity in debt issuance and retirement supports the conclusion that firms with good governance structures actively seek an optimal capital structure corresponding to profits.Originality/value: This study adds value to existing literature. It is the first to identify the importance of governance in defining the relationship between profits and leverage. It recognizes unaccounted endogeneity concerns and employs an inspired IV approach to control for feedback from multiple endogenous regressors. Evidence for capital structure adjustment by firms with good governance is also substantiated. Lastly, the first unqualified evidence for the trade-off model is provided.

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UBUmar Butt
Umar Butt
TCTrevor William Chamberlain
Trevor William Chamberlain
This study examines the performance and resilience of Islamic banks during the COVID-19 pandemic, a period marked by unprecedented global economic disruption. Drawing on empirical data and a comparative analysis with conventional banking institutions, the research evaluates key financial indicators—liquidity, profitability, asset quality, and capital adequacy—to assess how Islamic banks responded to the crisis. The unique principles of Islamic finance, including risk-sharing, asset-backed financing, and the prohibition of interest and speculative activities, provide a distinct framework for crisis response. By analyzing how these features influenced bank performance during the pandemic, the study offers valuable insights into the relative robustness of Islamic versus conventional banking models. The findings contribute to the academic discourse on financial stability and risk management, offering practical implications for policymakers, regulators, and stakeholders to strengthen financial systems against future global shocks.

28 November 2018 in Australian Journal of Management
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UBUmar Butt
Umar Butt
This article empirically shows that the cost of new debt is higher for firms that commit covenant violations. Using a proxy for product market competition to capture exogenous changes to a firm’s competitive environment, I find that the cost is systematically higher for firms that operate in competitive markets. Moreover, I identify channels through which violations can increase the cost of new debt, namely, the incidence, timing and frequency effects, and I document these effects to be more acute for competitive markets. Overall, the study finds that the market prices financial contracts by taking into account the information content of the violation and the risk arising from market competition. JEL Classification: G12, G30

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UBUmar Butt
Umar Butt
TCTrevor William Chamberlain
Trevor William Chamberlain
This paper examines the relationship between the presence of blockholdings and stock returns and return volatility in the United Arab Emirates. Earlier studies report mixed results for the direction of the relationships across both developed and emerging markets. This study focuses specifically on these relationships in a dividend policy framework. This study further investigates the role of blockholder type by distinguishing between government, individual and corporate blockholders. Our results indicate that blockholder ownership reduces stock return volatility for both non-dividend-paying and dividend-paying stocks, does not impact returns and is not perceived as expropriating the wealth of other investors. We also conclude that the blockholders do not exhibit rent-seeking behavior through the extraction of dividends and investors in UAE firms embrace the role of blockholders and the reinvestment of profits.

16 September 2011 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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UBUmar Butt
Umar Butt
Do debt covenant violations increase the cost of borrowing for violating firms? By examining the SEC filing of and bond issue by all US nonfinancial firms from 1996 to 2005, I find that debt covenant violations play an important role in determining the cost of debt for firms. The results indicate that debt covenant violations are important from three aspects: the incidence of violation, the timing of the violation and the frequency of the violation. The results outline these three aspects. First, I find that violating firms on average have a higher cost of borrowing (100 to 107 bps) compared to non-violators. Second, I find that firms which report a violation in the bond-issue quarter have a higher cost of borrowing (30 to 44 bps) compared to firms that did not report a violation and firms that report a debt covenant violation in the quarter preceding the bond-issue report a higher cost of borrowing (88 to 105 bps) compared to non-violators. Third, I find that firms that report exactly one debt covenant violation have a higher cost of borrowing (13-47 bps) than non-violating firms, although the increase is not significant. I also find that firms that report more than one debt covenant violation have a higher cost of borrowing (39-48 bps) than non-violating firms. I conclude that there are significant benefits of not violating a debt covenant and violators are penalized by the creditors for not upholding the contractual restrictions.