Selective neurological impairments can shed light on different aspects of motor cognition. Brain-damaged patients with anosognosia for hemiplegia deny their motor deficit and believe they can still move the paralysed limb. Here we study, for the first time, if the anomalous subjective experience that their affected hand can still move, may have objective consequences that constrain movement execution with the opposite, intact hand. Using a bimanual motor task, in which anosognosic patients were asked to simultaneously trace out lines with their unaffected hand and circles with their paralysed hand, we found that the trajectories of the intact hand were influenced by the requested movement of the paralysed hand, with the intact hand tending to assume an oval trajectory (bimanual coupling effect). This effect was comparable to that of a group of healthy subjects who actually moved both hands. By contrast, brain-damaged patients with motor neglect or actual hemiplegia but no anosognosia did not show this bimanual constraint. We suggest that anosognosic patients may have intact motor intentionality and planning for the plegic hand. Rather than being merely an inexplicable confabulation, anosognosia for the plegic hand can produce objective constraints on what the intact hand does.

Despite the fact that any successful achievement of willed actions necessarily entails the sense of body ownership (the feeling of owning the moving body parts), it is still unclear how this happens. To address this issue at both behavioral and neural levels, we capitalized on sensory attenuation (SA) phenomenon (a self-generated stimulus is perceived as less intense than an identical externally generated stimulus). We compared the intensity of somatosensory stimuli produced by one's own intended movements and by movements of an embodied fake hand. Then, we investigated if in these two conditions SA was equally affected by interfering with the activity of the supplementary motor area (SMA; known to be related to motor intention and SA) using single-pulse transcranial magnetic stimulation. We showed that ownership of the fake hand triggered attenuation of somatosensory stimuli generated by its movements that were comparable to the attenuation of self-generated stimuli. Furthermore, disrupting the SMA eliminated the SA effect regardless of whether it was triggered by actual participant's movements or by illusory ownership. Our findings suggest that SA triggered by body ownership relies, at least in part, on the activation of the same brain structures as SA triggered by motor-related signals.