Is making an explicit distinction between politically moderate devout Muslims and political radicals empirically valid? If yes, in what ways do political moderates differ from political radicals? By systematically examining cross-national Muslim attitudes, this article scrutinizes the distinctiveness of politically moderate and politically radical Islam against the weight of empirical evidence. By drawing from extant theoretical linkages, we conduct a confirmatory factor analysis of cross-national survey data from 13 Muslim-majority states to test the fit of two widely theorized factors—moderate and radical Islamism. The findings suggest that support for politically moderate Islam is distinctively different from support for politically radical Islam. This article makes two key contributions. First, this study introduces a systematic empirical operationalization of Political Islam, and a more nuanced measurement thereof for empirical research. Second, the findings help advance our understanding of the variation in politically divergent religious attitudes in the Islamic world.
This paper argues that the following common patterns help explain the ongoing Islamic revival in Central Asia: (a) “de-modern” and “ethnicized” Islam as an enduring legacy of the Soviet period; (b) penetration of Salafism; (c) securitization of “non-official” Islam by state and non-state actors and (d) the rise of conservative Islam which goes hand in hand with retraditionalization. These factors, in their turn, pose serious challenges to developing inclusive society and human rights in Central Asian countries. This paper argues that the Islamic revival in Central Asian countries has come to the point when it can be analyzed under the prism, whether it impedes the development of inclusive society and human rights or not.
7 June 2025 in Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media
Telegram emerged as a crucial platform for both parties during the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Per its minimal policies for content moderation, Pro-Kremlin narratives and potential misinformation were spread on Telegram, while anti-Kremlin narratives with related content were also propagated, such as war footage, troop movements, maps of bomb shelters, and air raid warnings. This paper presents a dataset of posts from both pro-Kremlin and anti-Kremlin Telegram channels, collected over a period spanning a year before and a year after the Russian invasion. The dataset comprises 404 pro-Kremlin channels with 4,109,645 posts and 114 anti-Kremlin channels with 1,117,768 posts. We provide details on the data collection process, processing methods, and dataset characterization. Lastly, we discuss the potential research opportunities this dataset may enable researchers across various disciplines.
Analysis of state regulation of Islam in post-communist states shows that tolerant policies are associated with lower levels of religious radicalism, whereas restrictive policies appear to exacerbate the level of extremism.
To what extent does openness to new ideas and creativity (ONIC) help explain the elite-challenging collective mobilisation in the Muslim world? Are religious Muslims who are open to creative and innovative thinking more or less likely to engage in pro-democratic collective action? Analysing 16 Muslim-majority countries, this study advances the debate of Muslim contentious politics by systematically examining the extent to which ONIC explains the variation in high-risk, pro-democratic collective mobilisation. A quad-dimensional analysis of creativity indicates that ONIC is an empirically distinctive measure to capture openness and creative thinking. The evidence further suggests that, ceteris paribus, Islamic religiosity and ONIC are not mutually exclusive and that both are positively associated with collective protests. Notably, ONIC does appear to intervene to mediate the positive relationship between Islam and engagement in high-risk collective action, implying that the effects of religiosity may not be independent from how Muslims position themselves towards being open to novel ideas or creativity. The findings also demonstrate that an individual-level ONIC may be boosting the likelihood of protest engagement among more devout individuals in Islamic societies.
While the relationship between Islam and democracy has received considerable attention in the social science literature, very few studies have explained the dynamics of support for democracy through a micro-level, socio-psychological lens. Applying a novel perspective, this study analyzes the empirical nexus among Islamic religiosity, being open to new ideas and creativity (ONIC), and pro-democratic attitudes to probe the following two questions: Are Muslims who are open to new ideas and think creatively more supportive of democracy than those who are not? Could ONIC be an intervening factor between religiosity and support for democracy? To this end, the paper systematically (1) examines the interrelationship between ONIC and Islamic religiosity; (2) estimates the effects thereof on support for democracy; (3) assesses the mediating potential of ONIC between devoutness and pro-democratic attitudes through an illustrative case of Turkey. The findings indicate that ONIC and Islamic religiosity are not mutually exclusive. The evidence also suggests that, ceteris paribus, while religiosity is positively associated with pro-democratic attitudes, the mediating potential of ONIC is inconclusive. Religiosity and ONIC appear to have an independent effect on support for democracy. Educational reforms or policies that cultivate and support creative thinking might be consequential for building and fostering democracy in Islamic societies.