Empirical studies have shown, paradoxically, that increasing the probability of apprehension can correlate with an increase in the total number of criminal acti

In this paper, we investigate optimal delegation mechanisms in the presence of countervailing conflicts of interest in the context of principal–agent problems. We introduce two dimensions of conflict of interest—pandering incentives related to the outside option and project biases. We compare three delegation mechanisms: full delegation, veto-based delegation, and communication (no delegation). Contrary to conventional one-dimensional conflict models, our findings reveal a non-monotonic relationship between pandering incentives and bias. These conflicts counterbalance each other, resulting in a principal’s benefit from delegation not strictly decreasing with increased bias. Surprisingly, delegation to a biased agent can be advantageous in certain scenarios. This research sheds light on the complex dynamics of delegation mechanisms when confronted with countervailing conflicts of interest, offering insights into decision-making in principal–agent relationships.

The App Store introduced a title-length limit for mobile apps in 2016, and similar policies were later adopted across the industry. This issue drew considerable attention from industry practitioners in the 2010s. Using both empirical and theoretical approaches, this paper examines the effectiveness of this policy and its welfare implications. Title length became an issue because some sellers assemble meaningful keywords in the app title to convey information to consumers, while others combine irrelevant yet popular keywords in an attempt to increase their app’s downloads. We hypothesize that when titles are short, title length is positively associated with an app’s performance because both honest and opportunistic sellers coexist in the market. However, due to the presence of opportunistic sellers, once titles become too long, this positive relationship disappears. We examine this hypothesis using a random sample of 1998 apps from the App Store in 2015. Our results show that for apps with titles longer than 30 characters, title length remains positively associated with app performance. However, for titles exceeding 50 characters, we do not have sufficient evidence to conclude that further increases in length continue to generate additional downloads. To interpret our empirical findings, we construct communication games between an app seller and a consumer, in which the equilibrium is characterized by a threshold. Based on our model and empirical observations, the 30-character limit might hurt consumers.

We examine languages under two-dimensional uncertainty about the state — the type and support of the state-distribution as well as the state is ex-ante uncertai

Empirical studies have shown, paradoxically, that increasing the probability of apprehension can correlate with an increase in the total number of criminal actions. To examine this phenomenon, we develop a dynamic model of »personal rules« in which forgetfulness and hyperbolic discounting together can cause a potential criminal to commit more crimes as the probability of apprehension increases. At the time of the future decision, he may commit a crime due to hyperbolic discounting, even if it is not profitable. Hence, he may choose not to commit a crime today as a commitment device to abstain from crime in the future. However, increased prosecution can limit the effectiveness of the commitment device.