Apiculture has been greatly developed in recent years in China. Beekeeping cooperatives and honey manufacturing enterprises have increased rapidly. As a result, a variety of honey products have entered the market, adding vitality to the food economy; however, the adulteration of honey products is on the rise in China. Previous attempts to control the adulteration of honey products mostly relied on technical, product-specific measures, and there was a lack of modeling research to guide the supervision of the honey product industry. In order to help local governments to better control the adulteration of honey products from a management perspective, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model composed of beekeeping cooperatives, honey product enterprises, and local governments. Through stability analysis and model simulation, we found that local government subsidies to cooperatives have little impact on the game system. Local government penalties to cooperatives and price adjustments of unadulterated raw honey by cooperatives are effective management tools to reduce the adulteration behavior of cooperatives. Local government penalties for enterprises are an effective management tool to reduce the adulteration behavior of enterprises. This research provides useful information for government agencies to design appropriate policies/business modes so as to promote sustainability and the healthy development of the honey product industry in China.

In this paper, an output dynamic game model of intertwined supply chains operating in two different countries is established. The Nash equilibrium point of the model and its stable region are obtained using nonlinear dynamic principles. The complex properties of the system, such as stability, period-doubling bifurcations, and chaos, are investigated using numerical simulations. Our results suggest that the level of output and the system’s profits undergo bifurcation and chaos with an increase in the output adjustment speed. An interesting phenomenon occurs in that higher tariffs lead to the expansion of the stable range of the supply chain in the product-exporting country. The chaotic behavior of the system is sensitive to the value of the initial level of output. In supply chain competition, each supply chain firm should make suitable adjustments to the speed of output. To maintain the stability of domestic markets, excessive tariffs should be avoided. It is essential that each supply chain firm evaluates the potential impacts of different initial output values when making initial decisions. Using the method of delayed feedback control, the chaotic behavior of the system can effectively be controlled. These findings offer valuable and novel insight into inter-chain competition in supply chain networks.

Super-rational aspiration induced strategy updating with exit rights has been considered in some previous studies, in which the players adjust strategies in line with their payoffs and aspirations, and they have access to exit the game. However, exit payoffs for exiting players are automatically allocated, which is clearly contrary to reality. In this study, evolutionary cooperation dynamics with super-rational aspiration and asymmetry in the Prisoner's Dilemma game is investigated, where exit payoffs are implemented by local peers. The results show that for different population structures, the asymmetry of the system is always contributive to the participation of the players. Furthermore, we show that under different exit payoffs, super-rationality and asymmetry are conductive to the evolution of cooperation.

Pedestrian evacuation efficiency is paramount to public safety and sustainable urban resilience. This study utilizes an agent-based model simulating evacuation dynamics in a built environment to assess the impact of route familiarity, interpersonal interactions, and storage layout on evacuation efficiency. The model incorporates an evolutionary game theory framework to capture strategic decision-making, featuring both symmetric and asymmetric interactions among evacuees with varying levels of exit information (complete, partial, or none). Results show that familiarity with exit location is the most decisive element for evacuation, significantly outweighing the influence of crowd interactions, imitation behaviors, group composition, or storage layout. Furthermore, the crowd composition exerts a significant moderating effect, so that asymmetric group structures yield superior evacuation performance compared to symmetric ones. The optimal storage layout for evacuation is contingent upon the availability of exit information. An orderly layout is superior when information is known, whereas a random layout proves more effective in the absence of information by preventing misleading paths. Thus, providing clear information, adaptable spatial designs and consciously constructing a heterogeneous population structure are more critical for evacuation. This work provides actionable insights for architects and safety planners, contributing directly to the development of safer, more sustainable built environments and supporting Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 11, particularly Target 11.5.