Automatic Exploit Generation (AEG) involves automatically discovering paths in a program that trigger vulnerabilities, thereby generating exploits. While there is considerable research on heap-related vulnerability detection, such as detecting Heap Overflow and Use After Free (UAF) vulnerabilities, among contemporary heap-automated exploit techniques, only certain automated exploit techniques can hijack program control flow to the shellcode. An important limitation of this approach is that it cannot effectively bypass Linux’s protection mechanisms. To solve this problem, we introduced Automatic Advanced Heap Exploit Generation (AAHEG). It first applies symbolic execution to analyze heap-related primitives in files and then detects potential heap-related vulnerabilities without a source code. After identifying these vulnerabilities, AAHEG builds an exploit abstract syntax tree (AST) to identify one or more successful exploit strategies, such as fast bin attack and Safe-unlink. AAHEG then selects exploitable methods via an abstract syntax tree (AST) and performs final testing to produce the final exploit. AAHEG chose to generate advanced heap-related exploits because the exploits can bypass Linux protections. Basically, AAHEG can automatically detect heap-related vulnerabilities in binaries without source code, build an exploit AST, choose from a variety of advanced heap exploit methods, bypass all Linux protection mechanisms, and generate final file-form exploit based on pwntools which can pass local and remote testing. Experimental results show that AAHEG successfully completed vulnerability detection and exploit generation for 20 Capture The Flag (CTF) binary files, 11 of which have all protection mechanisms enabled.
Although it has been demonstrated that Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithms are vulnerable to deliberate attacks, the question of whether such weaknesses can lead to software security threats is under-explored. To bridge this gap, we conducted vulnerability tests on Text-to-SQL systems that are commonly used to create natural language interfaces to databases. We showed that the Text-to-SQL modules within six commercial applications can be manipulated to produce malicious code, potentially leading to data breaches and Denial of Service attacks. This is the first demonstration that NLP models can be exploited as attack vectors in the wild. In addition, experiments using four open-source language models verified that straightforward backdoor attacks on Text-to-SQL systems achieve a 100% success rate without affecting their performance. The aim of this work is to draw the community's attention to potential software security issues associated with NLP algorithms and encourage exploration of methods to mitigate against them.
Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) pose a notable privacy threat by determining whether specific samples were used to train a target model. Existing approaches primarily rely on static model outputs or computationally expensive shadow models, neglecting the dynamic stability of predictions under input perturbations. We propose a novel framework that systematically integrates Temperature Scaling, MC Dropout, and FGSM, shifting the attack paradigm from point-based observation to function-based uncertainty modeling. Through this multi-perturbation lens, PUC captures fine-grained memorization dynamics, enabling a comprehensive and efficient evaluation. We introduce a specialized curve feature engineering pipeline to extract geometric and statistical indicators from continuous response curves, quantifying prediction dynamic stability into compact feature vectors that enhance discriminative power. Extensive experiments on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and PathMNIST validate the framework’s effectiveness. Results demonstrate that PUC outperforms competing methods, particularly on ResNet-18, maintaining robust performance even at extremely low false positive rates. Specifically, it improves the AUC by 16.7 percentage points on CIFAR-10 and 4.2 percentage points on CIFAR-100 compared to LiRA.