This article empirically explores the finance‐growth relationship and the performance of the financial system measured by financial depth, accessibility, and efficiency of both financial sectors, that is, institutions and stock markets. It also examines the role of fiscal policy in conjunction with the performance of financial development during both normal and stress times. The data consists of a panel of 26 European Union countries over the period 1990–2020. The results show that during normal times, the finance‐led growth relationship and the stock market are greatly important, while during stress times the relationship becomes insignificant. Interestingly, financial institutions are found to be more effective at promoting growth and there is clear evidence that a potentially dynamic positive effect of institutions to growth is absorbed by macroeconomic shocks. In addition, there is evidence for a threshold at a lower level compared to those previously identified in the literature. This latter finding can be attributed to different measures of financial institutions used and the impact of macroeconomic shocks. The inability of both financial sectors to enhance economic activity seems to exhibit persistence from the occurrence of the global financial crisis until the onset of the recent Covid‐19 pandemic.

This paper investigates how the credit to private sector affects the impact of household debt on economic growth in 25 European Union countries over the period 1995-2018. The findings reveal that the positive effect of household debt on economic growth turns to negative with the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) and beyond a certain point at around 58% of GDP, thus suggesting that their relationship is non-linear. Interestingly, the adverse effect subjects to the increased pressure of the credit to private sector when it is above 70%, and the pressure becomes even higher when the ratio is above 90%.

Purpose: The paper aims to explore the mechanisms linking the impact of financial development on economic growth and focuses on the long-term post-global financial crisis.Design/methodology/approach: The study employs panel data for twenty-five European Union countries over the period 1995–2017. Principal Component Analysis is employed to produce two aggregate indices, namely financial banking sector development and stock market sector development. The empirical analysis is based on estimates through the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) method.Findings: The results suggest that the outbreak of the crisis has led to a disruption of the positive finance-growth relationship, and the banking sector dominates in this adverse effect. The foreknowledge of the current study is that the linking mechanisms of the negative impact of financial development on economic growth, ten years after the global financial crisis, are household debt, private debt, and non-performing loans for the banking sector, while for the equity market this is the case through savings. Interestingly, the results reveal that unemployment increase excessively the borrowers' debt level and then the non-performing loans.Research limitations/implications: An implication is that the increase of credit supply and any monetary expansion along with lack of regulatory control and monitoring can lead banks to a higher risk exposure through household and private debt as well as non-performing loans. Besides, the higher levels of unemployment rates call attention for the trade-off between prudential regulation on the supply of loans and economic activity, since higher unemployment affect the non-performing loans and, as a consequence discourage the demand, increase precautionary savings, and cancel or postpone investment decisions, thus, affecting the equity market.Originality/value: The paper provides useful insights to economists and policymakers who are interested in understanding the weakness of banking and stock market sectors to promote economic growth for a long time after the global financial crisis.

This paper investigates the dynamic stability of public debt and its solvency condition in the face of crisis periods (1980–2021) in a sample of 11 euro-area countries. The focus is on the feedback loop between the dynamic stability of public debt and interest rates, discounted by economic growth, in conjunction with budget deficits during tranquil and turbulent periods. Using the GMM panel dynamic model, the results show that dynamic stability was the case before the global financial crisis (GFC), while from GFC to the pandemic, dynamic instability prevailed and persisted in the evolution of public debt. Furthermore, panel threshold estimates show that dynamic instability of debt starts to violate the solvency condition when the borrowing cost is above 3.29%, becomes even stronger when it is above 4.39%, and exerts even more pressure when the level of debt is greater than 91%. However, the debt sustainability condition reverses course when economic growth is higher than 3.4%. The main policy implication drawn from the results is that low interest rates can create a self-reinforcing loop of high debt, which itself is a serious matter for public authorities when designing economic policies.

This paper investigates the dynamic stability of public debt and its solvency condition on the face of crises periods (1980-2021) in a sample of 11-euro area countries. The focus is on the feedback loop between dynamic stability of public debt and interest rates, discounted by the economic growth, in conjunction with budget deficits during tranquil and turbulent periods. Using the GMM panel dynamic model, the results show that dynamic stability was the case before the global financial crisis (GFC), while from GFC to pandemic, dynamic instability prevailed on the evolution of public debt. Moreover, dynamic instability exerted a highly persistent effect on the evolution of debt. Furthermore, panel threshold estimates show that dynamic instability of debt starts to violate the solvency condition when the borrowing cost is above 3.29%, becomes even stronger when it is above 4.39% and exerts even more pressure when the level of debt is greater than 91%. However, the debt sustainability condition reverses course when economic growth is higher than 3.4%. The main policy implication drawn from the results is that low interest rates can create a self-reinforcing loop of high debt, which is an issue for further research.