In this study, we provide a comprehensive examination of the performance of financial (specialty sector financial) mutual funds over a 23-year period, a much longer time frame than what has been analyzed in previous literature. To fully understand the performance of these mutual funds, we consider multiple factors, including risk-adjusted performance, both unconditional and conditional multifactor analysis, and market timing and selectivity. Financial mutual funds have higher risk-adjusted performance than the overall market and financial sector benchmarks. However, fund alphas are not different from zero, and managers do not exhibit market timing or security selection abilities. Our analysis not only includes the overall performance of these mutual funds, but we also delve into sub-samples before and after the 2008 financial crisis and during the recent Coronavirus pandemic.
We examine the impact of CEO marital status on firm innovative efficiency. We find that firms led by married CEOs produce 8% more patents and citations per unit of investment and generate more explorative patents. Married CEOs create a culture of tolerance among their employees that is conducive to risk taking, and their firms produce more efficient innovation (1) in regions that value social capital and (2) in firms that value favorable employee treatment. We find that the tolerant culture of married CEO firms produces more efficient innovation when occurring in tandem with mechanisms facilitating a long‐term strategic orientation.
Existing evidence indicates that acquirers reward and therefore value the merger completion abilities of acquisition advisors. We examine whether the focus on a
We examine the way investment banks allocate IPOs to their affiliated mutual funds worldwide. An underwriter may allocate hot IPOs to its affiliated funds to im
Mutual funds open up the door to diversified investments for individual investors in the stock and bond markets and minimize company-specific stock risk. Since mutual funds are managed by a team of investment professionals, they charge management fees to cover their operating costs, such as the cost of hiring and retaining investment advisors who manage funds’ investment portfolios. Since expenses are a charge against returns to investors, a fund with high fees must perform better than a low-cost fund to generate the same returns for the investor. Even small differences in fees can translate into large differences in returns when compounded over a period of time. This study examines whether higher advisory fee results in a superior rate of return for investors. If there is a link between advisory fee and returns, and are mutual fund investors paying attention? TOPICS: Mutual fund performance, manager selection, wealth management, equity portfolio management Key Findings • There has been a secular trend of declining advisory fees across the sample period. • Equity mutual funds’ 12-month total returns show more volatility than their advisory fee over the period of 2000 to 2017. • Advisory fees had a positive relation to the 12-month total returns, but in terms of causality, we did not find evidence that higher advisory fees are consistent with greater portfolio manager skill. In other words, paying more for advisory services in exchange for higher fund returns is not “worth it.”
Purpose: This study examines whether mutual funds buy or sell the stock of merger targets advised by their investment bank affiliates in advance of merger announcements and withdrawals. Existing literature finds mixed evidence on whether financial conglomerates act on conflicts of interest across divisions.Design/methodology/approach: Affiliations between investment banks and mutual funds are identified, and the incidence and characteristics of mergers where funds trade the stock of targets advised by affiliates are examined.Findings: Mutual funds buy or increase holdings of merger targets advised by their investment bank affiliate in advance of merger announcements, capturing highly positive abnormal returns. Mergers with this pre-announcement trading by affiliates are more likely to be completed successfully. Furthermore, mutual funds are more likely to liquidate holdings of a target in advance of a merger withdrawal if the fund is affiliated with the target's investment bank advisor, thus avoiding negative abnormal returns surrounding merger withdrawals. Results are robust after controlling for potential sample selection bias.Originality/value: These findings contribute to the literature on affiliations between investment banking and mutual fund management, M&A outcomes, and to the discussion of potential conflicts of interest within banks. Also, this study is the first to examine trading activities by mutual funds affiliated with merger investment bank advisors during value-sensitive periods beyond the pre-announcement phase, such as the time period leading up to merger withdrawals.