James C. Simeon

Prof. Dr. James C. Simeon

Head of McLaughlin College, Faculty of Liberal Arts & Professional Studies, York University, Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

17Years (2010-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 December 2014 in Journal of International Criminal Justice
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IAIdil Atak
Idil Atak
James C. SimeonJames C. Simeon
James C. Simeon
This article explores the intersections of international criminal law, human rights law and refugee law as it pertains to human trafficking. It assesses the challenges faced by foreign national trafficked persons who are seeking international protection and the difficulties in prosecuting those responsible for the crime of human trafficking. The article also discusses whether and how the interplay between these three branches of international law could help in overcoming these challenges and difficulties.

10 February 2010 in International Journal of Refugee Law
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James C. SimeonJames C. Simeon
James C. Simeon
The full implementation of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and/or its 1967 Protocol is contingent on the capacity of the UNHCR and state parties to respond to rapid fluctuations in new refugee status and asylum applications through the provision of fair, efficient, effective and independent refugee status determination (RSD) adjudicative structures and procedures. The number of new refugee status and asylum applications received by the UNHCR and six industrialized states (Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the United States, Sweden and the United Kingdom) between 2000 and 2008 show sharp variations in the number of persons seeking mandate or Convention refugee status. This article sets out a comparative analysis of the most pertinent concerns of the RSD systems within Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and the UNHCR, which reveals critical deficiencies with respect to the appointment of highly qualified, independent refugee law decision makers at first instance and to the issue of consistency. The article concludes by underscoring the necessity and importance of the UNHCR and state parties to work in unison with regard to these international human rights instruments to manage their response to forced migratory flows and to ensure that their RSD systems conform to internationally recognized and accepted core values and standards for RSD adjudication.

14 December 2017 in Laws
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Journal Article
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James C. SimeonJames C. Simeon
James C. Simeon
The unprecedented current “refugee crisis,” with its 65 million plus uprooted people, demands a new protection orientation and framework for refugees and other forced migrants that are focused on the “root causes” of refugeehood, non-international protracted armed conflict or civil war. It is argued that four essential reforms are required to the international refugee protection system to respond to the “root causes” of refugees in the world today. The first calls for broadening the definition of who is a refugee to include “war refugees” as found in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration and the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention. The 1984 Cartagena Declaration is preferred because it has the most progressive and broadest legal definition of who is a refugee and, therefore, should be emulated by all regions and the UNHCR internationally. The second reform would be the adoption of the Cartagena Declaration decennial consultation process and its comprehensive Plan of Action by the UNHCR on a global basis. This process has proven to be a success in Latin America and ought to be adopted internationally to develop and to realize the progressive advancement of international protection for all persons who are fleeing persecution and armed conflict. The third major reform is to develop the capacity of the UN to be able to operate in the midst of an armed conflict situation in order to broker a ceasefire and, then, negotiate a peace agreement, particularly, in those situations where massed forced displacement has taken place or potentially could take place. The fourth reform calls for the UN to expand the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine to incorporate massed forced displacement, in addition to, war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and, genocide. This further implies that mass forced displacement ought to be criminalized and made a serious international crime, not simply in the international humanitarian law and international criminal law sense of forced deportation, transfers, and expulsions, by opposing military forces, but in situations of armed conflict when people flee of their own volition in order to save their lives. These four reforms do not require a reformulation or reconceptualization of the international refugee protection system but a reform of a number of key elements that would simultaneously address the “root causes” of refugees and, especially, mass forced displacement that is due principally to non-international protracted armed conflict or seemingly endless civil wars.

17 February 2015 in International Journal of Refugee Law
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James C. SimeonJames C. Simeon
James C. Simeon
Refugee status determination is difficult by its very nature but it becomes even more complex when the issue of exclusion under article 1F(a) is raised and it is alleged that there are ‘serious reasons for considering’ that the applicant is ‘guilty of having committed a crime against peace, a war crime or a crime against humanity, as defined in the international instruments that have been drawn to make provision for such crimes’. The ‘War Crimes and Refugee Status’ Research Project’s Canadian jurisprudence dataset, consisting of 98 article 1F(a) cases, reveals that more than 91 per cent of these cases cite international humanitarian law (IHL) or international criminal law (ICL), but only 13 per cent of the cases cite UNHCR guidelines or directives. Interestingly, nearly two-thirds, 65.8 per cent, of these appeal cases are denied. Five of the most frequently cited judgments in this sample of cases were Ramirez, Moreno, Sivakumar, Harb, and Pushpanathan, in that order. After analyzing these five appeal court judgments in depth, seven legal principles were identified respecting the application and interpretation of IHL and ICL in Canada: (1) violations of international law can be committed by private individuals as well as states, or public officials acting on behalf of states; (2) the standard of proof for ‘serious reasons

8 August 2022 in Laws
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James C. SimeonJames C. Simeon
James C. Simeon
JRJoseph Rikhof
Joseph Rikhof
In any utopic vision of the international refugee protection regime at least these two conditions ought to prevail: (1) all those who are genuinely in need of refugee protection will be granted international protection; (2) all those who are responsible for criminality, especially, serious international crimes, shall be held criminally liable. This presumes that the so-called “exclusion clauses” of the 1951 Refugee Convention, Article 1F, and those found in the regional refugee rights instruments (1969 OAU Convention, 1984 Cartagena Declaration, 2011 EU Qualifications Directive) are not required. No one would be excluded from refugee protection who meets the definition of refugee as found in these international refugee rights instruments. By the same token, anyone who is responsible for serious criminality, especially, serious international crimes, (as defined by the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court) shall be held criminally liable. This serves the ideal of bringing an end to impunity for serious international criminality and ensuring everyone is held accountable for their contribution for the persecution of others. Accordingly, the first part of this article presents the thesis that serious criminality should be part of the inclusionary portions of the definition of who is a refugee and not its exclusionary portions, Article 1F of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Indeed, Article 1F, it is argued, is antiquated and no longer conforms to contemporary international norms and principles and can result in injustices to refugee applicants. Given the inherent complexity and difficulties with Article 1F and the fact it is no longer required, it can be repealed and Article 1A(2), the definition of who is a refugee, can be amended to not include anyone who is responsible for the commission of serious criminality. Moreover, when there is sufficiently reliable and trustworthy evidence that a refugee applicant is responsible for serious criminality then they can be prosecuted and by doing so both ending impunity for serious international crimes and advancing international justice can be achieved. The second part of the article is a commentary on the first part and raises a word of caution. The thesis of this part is that before adopting any radical solution with respect to the exclusion clause, it would be useful to provide a broader context to the issues raised. The commentary raises some questions regarding the underlying assumptions in the first part, specifically, in its examination of the human rights and international criminal justice framework. These questions are on three levels, namely conceptual, legal, and practical. The commentary concludes with some overarching observations in respect to the criticisms raised and the proposal submitted.

14 February 2019 in Laws
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Journal Article
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James C. SimeonJames C. Simeon
James C. Simeon
Terrorism is a concept that defies a simple and straightforward legal definition. Therefore, it is not surprising to find that there is no Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism with a universally accepted definition of what constitutes “terrorism.” Consequently, States have devised their own definitions of what constitutes terrorism that are typically found in their criminal law. This raises the fundamental question of whether there is a convergence or divergence in jurisprudential trends on what constitutes terrorism among States? Presumably, a convergence in jurisprudential trends is more likely to contribute to combatting the threat of terrorism at the international and national levels. Accordingly, this article comparatively analyzes the definition of terrorism in three common law jurisdictions: the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada. It finds that although there are a number of similarities in the definition of terrorism in these three States, they have significantly different definitions of what constitutes terrorism. The UK definition, ostensibly, has the broadest definition of terrorism of the three States. The US has, undoubtedly, the most unique, with separate definitions for “international terrorism” and “domestic terrorism.” Additionally, Canada has the most international definition of terrorism, drawing on 13 functional terrorism Conventions to define offenses such as hijacking, hostage taking, and bombing, etc. The second part of the article comparatively analyzes seven of the leading Supreme Court cases on terrorism in these three States. From the ratio or rationes decidendi in each of these cases, it draws out the twelve legal principles that underlie these judgements and finds that they are similar and overall consistent. The conclusion reached is that there is, at least in these three common law jurisdictions, an apparent convergence in jurisprudential trends in the law of terrorism. This augurs well for the development and emergence of a common definition of what constitutes terrorism at the international and transnational levels, as well as more rigorous and effective counter-terrorism laws and policies within and across States.