Wayne Riggs

Dr. Wayne Riggs

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

35Years (1992-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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4 September 2003
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WRWayne Riggs
Wayne Riggs
This chapter offers an alternative to the standard success-oriented epistemological theories by arguing that the highest epistemic good is a state which includes much more than the achievement of true beliefs and the avoidance of false ones. Indeed, it includes much more than knowledge: it requires understanding of important truths. For some of the intellectual virtues are best understood as directed at understanding rather than truth or knowledge. Whether the goal of the intellectual virtues is truth or understanding, reliable success cannot be necessary for the possession of an intellectual virtue given that some of the most impressive intellectual giants such as Aristotle, Newton, and Galileo are not noted for their success. The intellectual virtues should therefore be understood in terms of the values at which they aim, not the values they reliably bring about. The upshot of giving up success oriented approaches in epistemology will provide greater clarity in understanding intellectual virtues.

10 October 2006 in Synthese
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WRWayne Riggs
Wayne Riggs

11 January 2010 in Metaphilosophy
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WRWayne Riggs
Wayne Riggs

1 July 2008 in Synthese
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WRWayne Riggs
Wayne Riggs

13 May 2003 in Noûs
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WRWayne Riggs
Wayne Riggs

1 September 2009
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Book Chapter
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WRWayne Riggs
Wayne Riggs
A variety of ‘anti-luck’ theories of knowledge have recently been defended in the epistemological literature, but the nature of luck itself is contentious. Two prominent recent accounts of luck are the ‘lack of control’ theory and the ‘safety’ theory. This chapter undertakes a two-part defense of the former as against the latter—specifically, against Duncan Pritchard's version of the safety account. The first part argues that Pritchard's modal definition of luck falls to decisive counterexamples, both as a core notion of luck, and as a component in his theory of knowledge. The second part addresses an important objection that strikes at the heart of the lack of control account, the response to which illuminates some interesting features of luck that must be taken into account by any adequate theory.