Katherine (Kexin) Yu

Dr. Katherine (Kexin) Yu


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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25 April 2025 in Encyclopedia
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ZMZachery Ziqi Ma
Zachery Ziqi Ma
LSLinna Shi
Linna Shi
KYKatherine (Kexin) Yu
Katherine (Kexin) Yu
NZNan Zhou
Nan Zhou
To enhance financial reporting quality through increased oversight, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) Section 407 mandates that firms disclose whether their audit committee includes a financial expert or explains the absence of such an expert. The definition of a financial expert has been broadened to encompass not only accounting knowledge but also finance or supervisory experience. Financial experts on audit committees possess an advantage in information access due to their role on the committee and an advantage in information processing because of their superior skills. This combination of skills and access to private information enables audit committee financial experts to achieve superior performance. We review articles that show audit committee financial experts leveraging their information advantage in accounting to improve financial transparency, in auditing to maintain audit integrity, and in corporate governance to enhance monitoring effectiveness.

10 January 2024 in Encyclopedia
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
ZMZachery Ziqi Ma
Zachery Ziqi Ma
LSLinna Shi
Linna Shi
KYKatherine (Kexin) Yu
Katherine (Kexin) Yu
NZNan Zhou
Nan Zhou
Director interlocks occur when a board member or an executive of a firm sits on the board of directors of another firm. As an essential social network application in the business world, interlocking directorates are documented to be non-trivial from the 1930s and continue to gain popularity thereafter. Corporate information and business practices can be transferred to another firm through an interlocking director sitting on both companies’ boards. Such information dissemination leads to changes in an interlocking firm’s decision-making processes. Existing business research attempts to decipher the underlying reasons why board interlocks become prevalent, how and what information is being transferred through this channel, and the intended or unintended consequences to firm strategic, governance, financing, and accounting practices. We first introduce theoretical research on board interlocks in management and then follow up with empirical evidence in finance and accounting. Since extant studies have not reached a consensus on various consequences of board interlocks, we contribute to the literature by summarizing the findings from multi-business disciplines, discussing their advantages and disadvantages, and calling for more research on the topic.

5 November 2026 in Accounting and Auditing
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JRJanean Rundo
Janean Rundo
KYKatherine (Kexin) Yu
Katherine (Kexin) Yu
NZNan Zhou
Nan Zhou
Artificial intelligence (AI), data analytics, cloud-based systems, and other digital technologies are increasingly integrated into audit practice, creating new opportunities for audit effectiveness while also changing the relationships and resources on which auditors depend. Drawing on Resource Dependence Theory, we develop a conceptual framework examining both the potential benefits and independence risks associated with this dependence. Technology may support auditor objectivity by reducing certain forms of human judgment bias, improving analytical accuracy, and promoting more consistent audit procedures. At the same time, reliance on client and third-party systems, limited transparency into technology-generated outputs, shared technological infrastructure, and self-review concerns may create new challenges for auditor autonomy and professional judgment. We further consider potential safeguards, including auditor control over critical audit processes, appropriate human oversight of technology-assisted judgments, and governance and regulatory monitoring of material technology dependencies. By extending auditor independence beyond the traditional auditor–client relationship to consider the technological environment, this paper identifies implications for auditor independence and assurance quality and develops avenues for future research as audit practice continues to evolve. The framework differentiates economic, operational, and informational dependence and develops propositions linking these dimensions to auditor autonomy, independence in fact, independence in appearance, professional skepticism, and assurance quality.