To enhance financial reporting quality through increased oversight, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) Section 407 mandates that firms disclose whether their audit committee includes a financial expert or explains the absence of such an expert. The definition of a financial expert has been broadened to encompass not only accounting knowledge but also finance or supervisory experience. Financial experts on audit committees possess an advantage in information access due to their role on the committee and an advantage in information processing because of their superior skills. This combination of skills and access to private information enables audit committee financial experts to achieve superior performance. We review articles that show audit committee financial experts leveraging their information advantage in accounting to improve financial transparency, in auditing to maintain audit integrity, and in corporate governance to enhance monitoring effectiveness.
Director interlocks occur when a board member or an executive of a firm sits on the board of directors of another firm. As an essential social network application in the business world, interlocking directorates are documented to be non-trivial from the 1930s and continue to gain popularity thereafter. Corporate information and business practices can be transferred to another firm through an interlocking director sitting on both companies’ boards. Such information dissemination leads to changes in an interlocking firm’s decision-making processes. Existing business research attempts to decipher the underlying reasons why board interlocks become prevalent, how and what information is being transferred through this channel, and the intended or unintended consequences to firm strategic, governance, financing, and accounting practices. We first introduce theoretical research on board interlocks in management and then follow up with empirical evidence in finance and accounting. Since extant studies have not reached a consensus on various consequences of board interlocks, we contribute to the literature by summarizing the findings from multi-business disciplines, discussing their advantages and disadvantages, and calling for more research on the topic.
To enhance financial reporting quality through increased oversight, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) Section 407 mandates that firms disclose whether their audit committee includes a financial expert or explains the absence of such an expert. The definition of a financial expert has been broadened to encompass not only accounting knowledge but also finance or supervisory experience. Financial experts on audit committees possess an advantage in information access due to their role on the committee and an advantage in information processing because of their superior skills. This combination of skills and access to private information enables audit committee financial experts to achieve superior performance. We review articles that show audit committee financial experts leveraging their information advantage in accounting to improve financial transparency, in auditing to maintain audit integrity, and in corporate governance to enhance monitoring effectiveness.
Climate change has intensified employee welfare risk by increasing workers’ exposure to physical hazards, particularly extreme heat in outdoor occupations, thereby making employee welfare regulation an important channel through which climate risk affects firm operations. While welfare economics explains why such regulation arises, it does not determine how firms internalize regulatory mandates. Drawing on Becker’s cost-minimization framework, we posit that firms may respond to costly regulation not through mechanical compliance, but by reorganizing operations when compliance costs exceed reorganization costs. We examine this compliance-versus-restructuring response margin using the 2005 emergency adoption of the California Heat Illness Prevention Standards (CHIPS), the first mandatory, heat-specific occupational safety regulation in the U.S. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find that California establishments operating in heat-sensitive industries contract operating capacity following CHIPS, primarily through reductions in workforce and hours worked, without measurable improvements in workplace safety. In contrast, establishments in non-heat-sensitive industries expand operating capacity and experience modest safety gains. Firm-level evidence is consistent with these patterns. Firms in heat-sensitive industries record significant increases in restructuring charges, reflecting adaptation through operational reorganization. As regulation reshapes organizational scale, these adjustment costs are embedded in restructuring charges typically classified as non-recurring and excluded from core earnings. In contrast, firms in non-heat-sensitive industries increase compliance investment through capital expenditures. Collectively, these findings demonstrate that the consequences of climate-related employee welfare regulation hinge on firms’ previously underexplored yet consequential trade-off between compliance investment and operational restructuring.