Water scarcity is rising as a global issue, because the planet earth is facing a global water crisis, which is considered something that can destroy environmental sustainability of our planet. The fact is that humanity’s demand is depleting natural resources faster than nature can replenish itself; if human habits and unsustainable use of water resources do not change, water scarcity will inevitably intensify and become a major cause of conflict among different nations of the world. The water scarcity issue is a crucial issue but unfortunately it has not received due attention in past. Pakistan, which once was a water abundant country, now facing a situation of water scarcity. Pakistan has a poor irrigation system which results 60% loss of its water; Pakistan uses more water for crop production than other countries. Likewise, the country harvests water from rainfall, rivers, snow, and glaciers. The country is facing a serious water crisis that is caused by different factors, such as changing climatic conditions, rising population, poor irrigation system, poor political will, and rapid urbanization. The water crisis of Pakistan is expected to worsen in coming years. This is a drastic situation which calls for emergency measures. With this background, the present study provides a detailed view of the water situation in the country with challenges to water management. The study also suggests some recommendations for policymakers to improve the water crisis situation in the future.

Sanctions are a recurrent issue on the international scene that has gained relevance in recent decades. This article intends to approach this matter in an innovative way by analyzing the relative importance of sanctions’ types and objectives, besides target countries’ characteristics, on sanctions outcomes. Unlike most previous studies, we use more comprehensive data and a competing risk discrete-time hazard model to analyze the differences between sanctions termination by target compliance and sender capitulation. Our results show that the determinants for the two outcomes differ and that there are differences in the efficacy of sanctions according to their type and objective. We conclude that while higher levels of political volatility, democracy, and equality in target countries increase the probability of compliance, higher levels of democracy and globalization increase the probability of sender capitulation. Smart sanctions seem to be more effective at targeting compliance, as the likelihood of compliance is higher for financial and military sanctions than for trade. The likelihood of compliance also increases if the objective is to promote democracy and decreases if the objectives are policy, regime change, or terrorism. Instead, the probability of sender capitulation is higher for travel and trade sanctions and if the objective is to promote human rights.