Performance evaluation has great potential to encourage government officials to improve their behavior (performance-oriented government behavior, POGB), but it also tends to lead to behaviors that are detrimental to government performance (non-performance-oriented government behavior, NPOGB). The latter behaviors are prevalent in many parts of the world, especially in areas with fiscal federalist characteristics such as China. This study analyzes POGB and NPOGB and employs game theory to develop a theoretical model to explain the causes of NPOGBs in China, exploring how competition among different jurisdictions leads to them. The findings show that (1) POGB is a condition of Pareto optimality in government behavior, but only represents a very small share of all government behaviors. The majority of behaviors can be categorized as NPOGBs. (2) The primary reason continuous and volatile NPOGBs persist is that, from the perspective of local officials operating under the constraints of information scarcity and risk aversion, they are rational choices, and officials have to imitate one another’s behaviors so as not to be defeated in the competition with others.

Government performance evaluation has a long history. However, major differences of opinion regarding its role still exist both in Western and Chinese academia, from theoretical, and practical perspectives. In this article, we conduct an empirical measurement of the role played by government performance evaluation and construct a regression model to explore the major factors influencing public officials’ perception, relying on survey data from a district government of county level in Guangdong Province. The study reveals that the average value of 14 items measuring government performance evaluation was 3.36 points (out of a possible 5 points). The role of the government in setting annual objectives, tasks, and priorities, as well as strategic planning, and target setting, and strengthening departmental accountability, had the most significant effect on the perception of efficacy of performance evaluation, whereas departmental budget setting, resource allocation, and reduction of operating costs had the least effect. Furthermore, performance communication and feedback, as well as the validity of the performance indicator system, also significantly influence the perception of the role played by government performance evaluation. The article concludes with a discussion of the differences between government performance evaluation in the West and in China.

External events impact significant policy changes. This study integrates the Advocacy Coalition Framework, Multiple Streams model, and Punctuated Equilibrium Theory to analyze how external events influenced China’s abolition of the Labor Reeducation System (LRS). Findings show that external events broke through decision makers’ attention constraints, shifted power dynamics, and created an opportunity for change. Limited learning occurred within coalitions as a tactical response to shocks, while intercoalition learning resulted from higher authorities’ interference. Destabilizing events reduce consensus requirements and reinforce China’s authoritarian decision-making style. The role of external events depends on their alignment with the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) ideology and political interests.