With the exponential growth of connected Internet of Things (IoT) devices around the world, security protection and privacy preservation have risen to the forefront of design and development of innovative systems and services. For low-value IoT devices that identify and track billion of goods in various industries—such as radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags—this involves multiple challenges in very constrained environments. IoT devices aim to design low-cost, low-complexity infrastructure while enabling robust authentication protocols with reduced latency and energy consumption. Given these challenges, in this article, we present a new lightweight authentication protocol for IoT applications, employing an authenticated-encryption (AE) cryptosystem with associated data (AEAD). Since AEAD algorithms provide data confidentiality and message integrity simultaneously, security analysis [Real-or-Random (RoR) and Scyther] results prove the robustness of the proposed protocol against IoT threats. Furthermore, to measure the computation and communication cost, FPGA and ASIC simulations using four different AEAD candidates of National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) lightweight cryptography competition are executed. The implementation results [e.g., 4744 gate equivalent (GE) and 0.87-mw power] clearly show that our novel design can be applied to a wide range of constrained IoT devices complying with low-cost, lightweight, and high-speed requirements.

With the exponential increase of Internet of things (IoT) connected devices, important security risks are raised as any device could be used as an attack channel. This preoccupation is particularly important with devices featuring limited processing power and memory capabilities for security purposes. In line with this idea, Xu et al. (2018) proposed a lightweight Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) mutual authentication protocol based on Physical Unclonable Function (PUF)—ensuring mutual tag-reader verification and preventing clone attacks. While Xu et al. claim that their security protocol is efficient to protect RFID systems, we found it still vulnerable to a desynchronization attack and to a secret disclosure attack. Hence, guidelines for the improvements to the protocol are also suggested, for instance by changing the structure of the messages to avoid trivial attacks. In addition, we provide an explicit protocol for which our formal and informal security analysis have found no weaknesses.

In today’s competitive landscape, manufacturing companies must embrace digital transformation. This study asserts that integrating Internet of Things (IoT) technologies for the deployment of real-time location systems (RTLS) is crucial for better monitoring of critical assets. Despite the challenge of selecting the right technology for specific needs from a wide range of indoor RTLS options, this study provides a solution to assist manufacturing companies in exploring and implementing IoT technologies for their RTLS needs. The current academic literature has not adequately addressed this industrial reality. This paper assesses the potential of Passive UHF RFID-RTLS in Industry 5.0, addressing the confusion caused by the emergence of new ’passive’ RFID solutions that compete with established ’active’ solutions. Our research aims to clarify the real-world performance of passive RTLS solutions and propose an updated classification of RTLS systems in the academic literature. We have thoroughly reviewed both the academic and industry literature to remain up to date with the latest market advancements. Passive UHF RFID has been proven to be a valuable addition to the RTLS domain, capable of addressing certain challenges. This has been demonstrated through the successful implementation in two industrial sites, each with different types of tagged objects.

A smart grid is an electricity network that uses advanced technologies to facilitate the exchange of information and electricity between utility companies and customers. Although most of the technologies involved in such grids have reached maturity, smart meters—as connected devices—introduce new security challenges. To overcome this significant obstacle to grid modernization, safeguarding privacy has emerged as a paramount concern. In this paper, we begin by evaluating the security levels of recently proposed authentication methods for smart meters. Subsequently, we introduce an enhanced protocol named PPSG, designed for smart grids, which incorporates physical unclonable functions (PUF) and an elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) module to address the vulnerabilities identified in previous approaches. Our security analysis, utilizing a real-or-random (RoR) model, demonstrates that PPSG effectively mitigates the weaknesses found in prior methods. To assess the practicality of PPSG, we conduct simulations using an Arduino UNO board, measuring computation, communication, and energy costs. Our results, including a processing time of 153 ms, a communication cost of 1376 bits, and an energy consumption of 13.468 mJ, align with the requirements of resource-constrained devices within smart grids.