There is a growing interest in the study of evolutionary dynamics on populations with some non-homogeneous structure. In this paper we follow the model of Lieberman et al . (Lieberman et al . 2005 Nature 433 , 312–316) of evolutionary dynamics on a graph. We investigate the case of non-directed equally weighted graphs and find solutions for the fixation probability of a single mutant in two classes of simple graphs. We further demonstrate that finding similar solutions on graphs outside these classes is far more complex. Finally, we investigate our chosen classes numerically and discuss a number of features of the graphs; for example, we find the fixation probabilities for different initial starting positions and observe that average fixation probabilities are always increased for advantageous mutants as compared with those of unstructured populations.

Monkeypox (MPX) is a zoonotic disease similar to smallpox. Its fatality rate is about 11% and it is endemic to the Central and West African countries. In this paper, we analyze a compartmental model of MPX dynamics. Our goal is to see whether MPX can be controlled and eradicated by voluntary vaccinations. We show that there are three equilibria—disease free, fully endemic and previously neglected semi-endemic (with disease existing only among humans). The existence of semi-endemic equilibrium has severe implications should the MPX virus mutate to increased viral fitness in humans. We find that MPX is controllable and can be eradicated in a semi-endemic equilibrium by vaccination. However, in a fully endemic equilibrium, MPX cannot be eradicated by vaccination alone.

In this paper, we investigate evolutionary games with the invasion process updating rules on three simple non-directed graphs: the star, the circle and the complete graph. Here, we present an analytical approach and derive the exact solutions of the stochastic evolutionary game dynamics. We present formulae for the fixation probability and also for the speed of the evolutionary process, namely for the mean time to absorption (either mutant fixation or extinction) and then the mean time to mutant fixation. Through numerical examples, we compare the different impact of the population size and the fitness of each type of individual on the above quantities on the three different structures. We do this comparison in two specific cases. Firstly, we consider the case where mutants have fixed fitness r and resident individuals have fitness 1. Then, we consider the case where the fitness is not constant but depends on games played among the individuals, and we introduce a ‘hawk–dove’ game as an example.

Evolution in finite populations is often modelled using the classical Moran process. Over the last 10 years, this methodology has been extended to structured populations using evolutionary graph theory. An important question in any such population is whether a rare mutant has a higher or lower chance of fixating (the fixation probability) than the Moran probability, i.e. that from the original Moran model, which represents an unstructured population. As evolutionary graph theory has developed, different ways of considering the interactions between individuals through a graph and an associated matrix of weights have been considered, as have a number of important dynamics. In this paper, we revisit the original paper on evolutionary graph theory in light of these extensions to consider these developments in an integrated way. In particular, we find general criteria for when an evolutionary graph with general weights satisfies the Moran probability for the set of six common evolutionary dynamics.