This research investigates the determinants of the capital structure of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) using a unique database that includes over 19,000 Brazilian firms and spans 13 years of data. The econometric analysis employs the System Generalized Method of Moments estimator (GMM-Sys) and two strong results emerge: (a) profitability is negatively related to leverage, and (b) asset growth is positively related to leverage. Both results are consistent with the pecking order theory of capital structure and suggest that SMEs tend to finance their expansion with debt only after exhausting their internal resources. Additionally, we find weaker evidence for the following: (a) size is positively related to leverage, which can be interpreted as evidence that larger firms have more access to credit markets; (b) riskier SMEs tend to be less financially leveraged, consistent with the bankruptcy cost arguments from trade-off theories; and (c) the age of the firm is negatively related to financial leverage, suggesting that older SMEs may be slightly more conservative in their financing choices. Finally, the magnitude of the coefficient of lagged leverage shows the high persistence of this variable and is compatible with the hypothesis that SMEs adjust their debt/equity ratio towards a target value, although at a low speed.
We exploit the exogenous shock to the Brazilian banking system caused by the international turmoil of 2008 and find evidence that the run to systemically important banks is better explained by the perception of a too-big-to-fail policy than by bank fundamentals. We infer that the extra inflow of deposits received by systemically important banks during crises gives them an important competitive advantage. Our analysis also indicates that a bank’s share of funding from institutional investors affects the nonfinancial firms’ and institutional investors’ decision to run.
1 September 2003 in RAE: Revista de Administracao de Empresas
A governança corporativa visa a aumentar a probabilidade de os fornecedores de recursos garantirem para si o retorno sobre seu investimento, por meio de um conjunto de mecanismos no qual se inclui o Conselho de Administração. Este artigo investiga se a estrutura de governança foi relevante para o valor das companhias abertas no Brasil entre 1998 e 2000. Três variáveis de governança foram consideradas: separação dos cargos de diretor executivo e presidente do conselho (DE), tamanho do conselho (TOT) e grau de independência do conselho (INDEP). Utilizou-se uma regressão múltipla do tipo seção transversal. DE foi a variável com os resultados mais importantes, apresentando evidência de que, em média, as empresas que têm pessoas distintas ocupando os cargos de diretor executivo e presidente do conselho são mais valorizadas pelo mercado.
This article investigates the simultaneous participation of directors in 320 Brazilian-listed companies in 2001, 2003, and 2005. Our results show that interlocking directorates are a common practice in Brazil. Firm value is, on average, negatively impacted by interlocking directorships, especially in firms in which a majority of directors hold three or more board positions. We also find evidence of a nonlinear relationship between interlocking and return on assets, consistent with the hypothesis that low and moderate levels of this practice may be beneficial to a company, while a high degree of interconnectedness among directors is likely to hurt performance.
13 April 2010 in Corporate Governance: The international journal of business in society
Purpose: This paper aims to investigate the determinants and the evolution of voluntarily adopted firm‐level corporate governance practices in Brazil from 1998 to 2004 using broad corporate governance scores.Design/methodology/approach: The authors employ a robust panel‐data procedure that accounts for the main sources of endogeneity to a very representative panel of Brazilian firms over a six‐year period. They address the endogeneity that arises from the simultaneous determination of the quality of corporate governance practices, the dependent variable, and possibly several firm attributes that are commonly employed as the determinants of such practices and are supposedly independent. Specifically, theoretical arguments and empirical evidence strongly suggest that the quality of corporate governance practices may influence some of the variables commonly used as its determinants just as much as they may be influenced by them.Findings: The paper finds that firm‐level corporate governance practices are steadily improving but there is much room for improvement. Heterogeneity has increased. Voluntarily adhering to new stricter listing requirements is associated positively with improvements in firm‐level corporate governance practices. Reducing or not using non‐voting shares improves corporate governance practices.Research limitation/implications: The authors found no clear evidence of the influence of other potential determinants of the quality of corporate governance, such as growth prospects, firm size, firm value, and ownership structure. Thus, they doubt previous findings that suggest a causal relationship from value and ownership to corporate governance practices because value and ownership seem to be determined endogenously.Practical implications: Policies directed to reduce the use of non‐voting shares should be implemented. Creating strict listing requirements that may be adopted voluntarily by firms could be a feasible solution to improve the quality of corporate governance practices in emerging market countries. Firms in an emerging market that find that issuance in the USA became too expensive or demanding may offer a substitute listing environment with credible requirements to foreign investors. Premium listings may partially compensate emerging market exchanges for their loss of trading to major markets.Originality/value: The paper examines the evolution of the voluntary adoption of corporate governance practices in Brazil from 1998 through 2004 while most studies use cross‐section samples over one or a few years. Further, this is one of a few papers to analyze the impact of ownership structure on the quality of corporate governance practices by segregating control and cash flow rights.