This research project uses econometric methods and comparative, cross-national data to see whether violations of human rights increase the likelihood of the onset or escalation of violent protest, terrorism and/or civil war. The findings show that these types of violent internal conflict will occur and escalate if governments: (1) torture, politically imprison, kill, or “disappear” people, (2) do not allow women to participate fully in the political system, including allowing them to hold high level national political office, and (3) do not allow women to participate fully in the economic life of the nation by ensuring equal pay for equal work, by encouraging their entry to the highest paid occupations, and by protecting them from sexual harassment at their workplaces. These types of violations of human rights and the existence of large horizontal inequalities in societies independently produce an increased risk of the onset and escalation of many forms of violent internal conflict. The results also provide some evidence for the argument that there is a trade-off between liberty and security.

(2020). Special Issue on Quantitative Human Rights Measures. Journal of Human Rights: Vol. 19, Special Issue on Quantitative Human Rights Measures, pp. 1-2.

On 18 July 2014, Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 was allegedly shot down by Ukrainian insurgents killing all 298 people aboard, including 173 Dutch, 44 Malaysian, 27 Australian, 12 Indonesian and 10 British citizens. Because of the rebels’ strong alliance with the Russian Republic, the international community immediately condemned the Putin regime—as it should. Yet, while the Russian state is certainly deserving of moral and political blame for this tragic event, what is less clear is Russian responsibility under international human rights law. The problem, as I will argue here, is that international law has often times struggled to assign state responsibility when national borders are crossed and thus when two (or more) sovereigns are involved. What provides additional uncertainty in the present situation is the possibility of competing case law from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).¹ As a final introductory point, while the focus of this article is on state responsibility for this particular event, soon thereafter, the situation in the Ukraine deteriorated even further when approximately 5,000 Russian troops took part in what now appears to have been a short-term invasion of that country. Thus, there are elements of both ‘indirect’ and ‘direct’ Russian involvement in the Ukrainian conflict. However, the larger issue is the repeated failure of international law to capture realities on the ground and to reflect the extent to which a state contributes to the violation of international human rights standards.

What role can US domestic courts play in the worldwide enforcement of human rights? When international courts deny hearings to individual plaintiffs who cannot obtain the sponsorship of their own government (which may well be the defendant), these plaintiffs are finding US courts increasingly willing to hear their cases. This volume considers the implications of this de facto extension of the jurisdiction of US courts, the problem of enforcing the decisions of the courts, the relationship between human rights law and foreign policy and the emerging consensus on the primacy of human rights over the sovereign rights of states.