This study investigates the evolutionary game dynamics of medical knowledge sharing (KS) among Chinese hospitals under government regulation, focusing on the strategic interactions between general hospitals, community health service centers, and governmental bodies. Leveraging evolutionary game theory, we construct a tripartite evolutionary game model incorporating replicator dynamics to characterize the strategic evolution of the involved parties. Our analysis examines the regulatory decisions of the government and the strategic choices of Chinese hospitals, considering critical factors such as KS costs, synergistic benefits, government incentives and penalties, and patient evaluations. The model is analyzed using replicator dynamic equations to derive evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs), complemented by numerical simulations for sensitivity analysis. Key findings reveal that the system’s equilibrium depends on the balance between KS benefits and costs, with government regulation and patient evaluations significantly influencing Chinese hospital behaviors. The results highlight that increasing government incentives and penalties, alongside enhancing patient feedback mechanisms, can effectively promote KS. However, excessive incentives may reduce willingness to regulate, suggesting the need for balanced policy design. This research provides novel theoretical insights and practical recommendations by (1) pioneering the application of a tripartite evolutionary game framework to model KS dynamics in China’s hierarchical healthcare system under government oversight, (2) explicitly integrating the dual influences of government regulation and patient evaluations on hospital strategies, and (3) revealing the non-linear effects of policy instruments. These contributions are crucial for optimizing Chinese medical resource allocation and fostering sustainable collaborative healthcare ecosystems.
Public hospitals in China are working to build an integrated online–offline healthcare system that combines telehealth and traditional healthcare to better serve patients. This study aims to explore Chinese patients’ preferences for online versus offline outpatient follow-up visits after the COVID-19 pandemic and to inform healthcare providers in designing optimal service delivery programmes. A discrete choice experiment was designed to elicit respondents’ stated preferences. A total of 311 valid respondents were recruited. Analysis of the full sample showed that respondents preferred traditional, offline outpatient follow-up visits. Nevertheless, a class of respondents was identified who preferred online outpatient follow-up visits. Our results show that Chinese patients are currently generally cautious about online outpatient follow-up visits since there is proportion of potentially targeted patients who stated a preference for online visits while the overall preference is still offline, in-person follow-up visits. Online outpatient follow-up visits could be attractive alternatives to traditional visits if they could meet potential users’ preferences for shorter waiting time for appointments, lower service cost, and continuity of follow-up visits. This study also suggests that it is necessary and worthwhile for healthcare providers to further explore the optimal integration of telehealth services with traditional healthcare.