The aim of this article is to analyse empirically whether the level of institutional quality influences how financial development affects poverty for a sample of developing countries covering the period from 1984 to 2012. Using an interaction term constructed as a product between financial development and institutional quality we find that the pro-poor impact of financial development decreases as the quality of institutions rises. Such a differential effect can be ascribed to the capacity of banks to provide functions that mimic those performed by an institutional framework that works well. The results of this article can be used for policy management.

We explore the distribution of public–private partnerships (PPPs) among the European Union countries, with a special focus on fiscal rules and budgetary constraints while controlling for empirically identified drivers. While offering the opportunity to increase innovation and efficiency in the public sector infrastructure, PPPs allow governments to relax their budget and borrowing constraints. We find that the state of public finances influences the government’s choice of PPPs and makes them more appealing for reasons other than efficiency. Stringent numerical rules on the budget balance also foster government’s opportunism in the choice of PPPs. On the other hand, high levels of public debt increase the country risk, and discourage private investors from PPP contracts. The results highlight the importance of restoring PPP investment choices based on efficiency criteria and adapt fiscal rules to shield public investment while stabilizing private expectations by means of credible trajectories of debt reduction. The findings contribute to the debate on the role of fiscal rules in fiscal policy and of PPPs in infrastructure financing.